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Widely differing theoretical expectations exist 
concerning the economic performance of labor-managed firms 
or producer cooperatives (PCs). While a good number of 
theoretical studies of these firms by economists have been 
undertaken, there remain considerable gaps in the empirical 
record. This is especially true in the case of American 
PCs. In general, theoretical controversies have not been 
tempered by enough empirical analysis. While some expect 
good performance from PCs, ethers are much less sanguine. 
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This study compares the economic performance of a 
group of eight worker-owned producer co-op plants with that 
of eight conventional mills in the Pacific Northwest 
softwood plywood i~dustry. 
The purpose is to test the validity of several 
proposi tions that are typically maintained in the analys is 
of pes suggesting that this type of organization basically 
lacks the incentive to utilize labor it. ~Jts efficiently I and 
is therefore less productive when compared to conventionally 
ocganized producing units. 
Using secondary datal pooled time-series cross-section 
eguations are estimated. Results indicate that growth in 
annual output per employee per year is 18 percent greater in 
the co-ops than in their conventional counterparts. The 
study provides strong evidence that the two groups of plants 
differ significantly in their behavior. The major 
conclusion that emerges is that worker-O\med co-ops are a 
viable and productive form of economic organization that 
utilize labor inputs efficiently and in doing so can achieve 
higher worker productivity than their conventional 
counterparts. In a public policy context l government 
support of employee ownership and establishment of 
worker-owned co-ops is viewed as a viable policy option to 
plant closings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a reawakening of 
interest in 
cooperatives 
The trend 
particularly 
countries. 
organizational forms such as producer 
(PCs) and the labor-managed economic system. 
towards this interest has become evident 
throughout most of western industrialized 
Employee-owned and participatory firms have 
begun to emerge in almost every part of the world. French 
examples include the large watch manufacturing of Lip and 
furni ture manufacturer of Manuest. The Canadian examples 
include Pioneer Chain Saw Manufacturers and the pulp mills 
at Tembec. In Britain, transitions into cooperatives 
include the motorcycle manufacturer at Meriden, Kirkby 
Manufacturing, and the Glascow daily newspaper, The Scottish 
Daily news. In the United States, various federal and state 
agencies have provided assistance in establishing worker-
owned firms. Among the best known Amer'ican cases are the 
Farm Home Administration assistance to Bates Manufacturing, 
the Economic Development Administration assistance to South 
Bend Lathe, and the $4.6 million loan provided by the 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development to the employees 
of Rath Meat Packing who bought their closing firm. 
Interest has also blossomed in schemes providing for 
some degree of worker participation in decision making, 
ana/or in ownership or profits. Typical of these schemes, 
which usually--though not always--do not fundamentally 
challenge the power structure, are employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOP), quality circle programs, and codetermination. 
Various factors have contributed to this recent 
development of interests in participatory and employee-owned 
firms. These include a desire for better industrial 
relations, 
inflation 
increasing 
decline in worker producti vi ty, high rates of 
and unemployment at times, and finally the 
awareness of the apparent viability of long 
schemes, such as the U. S. plywood PCs. But established 
perhaps the most important factor has been the reg ional 
stresses caused by plant closures and industrial relocation. 
Plant closure frequently has adverse consequences for 
suppliers, merch~nts producing local goods and services for 
sale to its work-force, distributors, municipalities 
dependent on the firm for revenue, and so forth. Today in a 
growing number of communities, workers and community groups 
are buying closing factories to save their jobs and 
communities. 
From an economic point of view, advocates argue that 
PCs are more likely to remain in local control thereby 
benefi ting the local economy, than are conventional firms. 
PCs are thought 
problems such 
humanization. 
to 
as 
PCs 
be better equipped 
job preservation 
have been viewed 
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",) tackle some 
and workplace 
as providing an 
effecti ve option to plant shutdowns and in many cases an 
effective overall strategy for local economic development. 
The establishment of local PCs is, therefore, a recognition 
of the structural nature of unemployment, requiring more 
viable solutions than have been offered by different 
governmental agencies. Advocates of PCs and workers' 
self-management argue that it is the only permanent solution 
to the problems of the workplace (e.g., alienation, job 
dissatisfaction, etc.). Some (e.g., Vanek, 1977 and Jones, 
1978) maintain that a great scope exists for tha potential 
PC sector within contemporary industrialized western 
economies. 
What makes the PC form superior to other schemes of 
industrial democracy is that it provides its employees with 
not only ownership of the enterprise, but also with active 
and effective participation in making decisions affecting 
employees' work and the company's operation. Other schemes 
of industrial democracy which are employed in the united 
States emphasize either employee participation on a limited 
basis or a small degree of ownership of the enterprise. 
Considering the positive effects of both ownership and 
participation on work performance, PCs are expected to 
produce greater results in terms of both human and material 
rewards than other schemes of industrial democracy. 
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Critics, including Sidney and Beatruce Webb 
(1920), who were among the very first advocate of consumer 
cooperati ve movements, view PCs as defective and as 
predisposed to collapse or resort to traditional capitalist 
forms of organization for some structural reasons. PCs are 
also thought unable to introduce technical change and to be 
characterized by poor discipline and poor knowledge of the 
market. Criticism of PCs has often been centered around the 
issues of viability and efficiency. For various reasons: 
some expect PCs to be intrinsically inefficient compared to 
conventional firms. This pessimism is shared by a number of 
Marxists as well as mainstream economists, though the 
particular reasons advanced usually differ. For some 
mainstream economists the alleged inability of P('s to take 
risks and questions of management will plaque PCs and 
ultimately help cause their doom (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1979). For some others, including a 
number of Marxists and writers connected with PC movements, 
PCs 
that 
are viewed as illusory and 
workers cannot implement 
insignificant, 
decisions taken 
suggesting 
(at the 
factory level) against the operation of market laws; and 
that "it is impossible to build island of socialism in a sea 
of capitalism" (Mandel, 1975 and Horvat, 1975). 
The conflicting views concerning performance and 
viability of PCs stem from the fact that the empirical body 
of evidence on these enterprises is small and hence 
insufficient to warrant any strong argument against or for 
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pes. 
In the light of this background, the plywood pes of 
the Pacific Northwest stand out as worthy of study. When we 
find not one but a group of long established participatory 
and worker-owned firms, an opportunity for a meaningful 
research presents itself. The group of plywood pes 
considered in the present study are functioning examples of 
producer cooperatives. \'H th eleven of these pes in 
operation for at least thirty years and some even longer, 
they refute the proposition that industrial producing 
cooperatives cannot survive and cannot remain cooperative. 
The plywood pes comprise a ~izable segmp.nt of the Northwest 
softwood plywood industry and have been important in its 
development. 
Most previous studies which have dealt with the 
plywood pes fall in two general categories: (1) those which 
mainly provided descriptive overviews of the operation of 
these pes (Bernstein, 1974 and Gunn, 1980b) and (2) those 
which investigated the effects of participation and/or 
ownership on organizational performance (Bellas, 1972 and 
Greenberg, 1980). Only Berman (1967) compares the 
performance of plywood pes (on an aggregate level) with that 
of the plywood industry as a whole. No attempt has 
apparently been made to compare the performance of plywood 
co-ops with a group of conventional plants. 
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Using a multilinear reyression model, this study 
compares the economic performance of plywood PCs wi th a 
group of conventional plants in the Northwest softwood 
plywood industry. Special emphasis is given to a 
comparative analysis of worker productivity between the two 
groups of plants. 
The study begins by reviewing the broad field of 
industrial democracy in Chapter II. Chapter I II addresses 
the general subject of producer cooperatives and reviews the 
theoretical and empirical research conducted in this area. 
A discussion of the softwood plywood industry is presented 
in Chapter IV to provide the basis for understanding the 
experience of the plywood PCs and the industry in which they 
operate. A descriptive overview of the formation and 
operation of the plywood PCs is then presented in Chapter V. 
Chapter VI presents the methodology used. Results and 
interpretat ions are reported in Chapter VII. The study 
concludes with an assessment of the features of the softwood 
plywood industry for cooperative operations, and with 
recommendations for publ ic pol icies regarding worker-owned 
cooperatives. 
CHAPTER II 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: 
WORKER PARTICIPATION AND OWNERSHIP 
Any discussion of industrial democracy runs into 
difficul ties because of a vagueness in the concept and the 
many different meanings injected into the term. In defining 
industrial democracy many have relied on the concept of 
worker participation and ownership. Worker participation 
and ownership, in turn, have a variety of meanings depending 
upon the objectives or aims they are meant to achieve, the 
forms they take, the range of issues subj ect to workers 
invol vement, and the degree to which workers can influence 
management decisions. 
Carnoy and Shearer (1980 ) perceive industrial 
democracy as the direct participation of employees in the 
government of the enterprise in such a way that it gives 
employees decision power over how work is to be done, how 
work is to be allocated, and how much workers are to be 
paid. Direct participation means the abil ity of all people 
involved in any situation to be personally engaged in the 
participation process. 
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It also means direct involvement of 
workers and employees in the process of control, management 
and exploitation of their enterprise (Wright, 1979). A 
system of industrial democracy, therefore, implies the 
opportunity for full higher level participation and 
ownership by employees. 
CONC~~TUAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
The subject of industrial d~mocracy consists of a very 
broad area which has resulted in different conceptual views. 
~lost theorists and researchers have generally focused on 
dimensions such as political and democratic theory, 
socialist theory, human growth and development, productivity 
and efficiency. 
Pateman (1970) can be mentioned as one of the leading 
theorists emphasiz ing the democratic and political aspects 
of industrial democracy. In Pateman's view, industry 
occupies a crucial position in the question of whether a 
participatory society is possible. Industry, with its 
relationship of superiority and subordination, is the most 
"political" of all areas in which ordinary individuals 
interact, and the decisions taken there have a great effect 
on the rest of their lives. 
The contemporary theorists of participation and 
democracy, such as Pateman, see a connection between 
participation in the workplace and participation in the 
wider political sphere. Political and democratic theorists 
9 
0f industrial democracy perceive the workplace as a 
potential training ground for acquiring particatory skills 
and resources, provided that it is organized in a 
participatory way. Elden (1981) provides empirical evidence 
directly supporting this view. However, in his study of the 
plywood PCs, Greenberg (1981) rejects the theory that 
experience of direct decision making at workplace 
necessarily leads to the enhanceme~t of cooperative and 
egalitarian orientation among participants. 
Socialist writers emphasize economic equality as the 
goal of worker control and industrial democracy (i.e., 
Mandel, 1975: Coates, 1971). They perceive society in terms 
of class interests which are incapable of resolutions within 
the present structure and contend that abuses encountered 
by workers in their employment can be overcome by a process 
of workers gaining crucial areas of control from management. 
The desirability of worker participation and ownership is 
seen by socialists and radical theorists to be based upon 
the notion that industry is divided into two opposing camps: 
the management, with its author i ty deri ved from property 
rights, and economic power to purchase labor: and the 
employees with their authority derived from the collective 
will of workers themselves. Thus, in socialists' view, 
worker participation in management decision making and 
ownership of means of production develops political efficacy 
among workers which is a potential threat to the status quo. 
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Vanek's (1970, 1971, 1975) work belongs to this 
category. He emphasizes a participatory structure oriented 
to jemocratic majority rule. For Vanek, a participatory and 
a 'ilorker-owned-and-managed firm serves as a vehicle for the 
formation of a participative economy which is responsive to 
human personality, as well as economic development. 
The human growth advocates of industrial democracy 
mainly emphasize the development of human personal i ty and 
mental health within organization life as the chief goal of 
industrial democracy. The work of Allport (1945): French, 
et. al.(1958); Vroom (1960); and Argyris (1971) stress 
worker participation program to create desired 
organizational change and employee motivation at work. The 
intention of authors in this perspective is to change 
organizations, by creating 
quality 
participatory 
of life within 
program, 
them. 
human growth 
and 
The 
and 
establish 
implication 
development 
a better 
of the 
area, is 
work within the 
that industrial democracy should be 
viewed as intrinsically worthwhile. 
The 1970s and early 1980s have witnessed the growth of 
literature oriented to the necessity for work and industrial 
democracy to conform to productivity and efficiency goals. 
Worker participation and ownership programs are perceived as 
partial solutions to problems such as decl ining 
productivi ty, absenteeism, alienation and inferior product 
quality. This view has developed with the assumption that 
11 
satisfied workers will lead to a productive and profitable 
work-force (Long, 1977 and 1978: Greenberg, 1980). 
Forms of Industrial Democracy 
It is important to distinguish between employees' 
control of their workplace through participation and control 
through ownership, since there are many ways in which worker 
control or industrial democracy can be achieved. 
Employee Participation: It may either be through 
direct involvement, or through representation of some kind 
(Hespe and Wall, 1976). Within each of these classes we 
have alternative lJarticipative structures such as 
face-to-face informal contact or meetings in the case of 
direct involvement. Supervisory boards, trade union 
representation, joint consultation, and employee directors 
are examples of representative participation. The extent of 
employee participation is thus dependent upon the forms of 
direct or indirect participation. Workers on the Board of 
Directors, for instance, has been implemented in a growing 
number of companies both in the united States and abr02-J. 
The theory behind this reform, at least to the extent that 
any clear theory exists, is that corporations ultimately are 
governed by their boards and that the emp .oyees of the firm 
are a constituency that must be recognized and represented 
on the governing body of the firm through their own elected 
repr&sentative. However, in a study of the European 
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experience conducted by Batstone and Davies (1976), it was 
found that worker directors had little effect on running 
their firms. 
Employee Ownership: This may also take different 
forms. Profit-sharing plans, for insl.::\nce, make employees 
partial "owners" of firms through direct or indirect stock 
purchases. By 1983, according to the ESOP Association, 
there were approximately five-thousand f irITIs in the United 
States with employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) and almost 
five-hundred companies in which employees held a majority of 
stocks (ESOP Association, 1983). Profi t-sharing plans do 
not usually give employees much, if any, control over wages, 
employment, or investment decision. Pension funds in 
various firms are also a source of worker control. But 
again, in practice, they have served as a ready and large 
source of investment capital for the firm without increasing 
workers' participation in decision making (Frisch, 1982). 
It is, however, important to distinguish between firms 
that have employee ownership arrangements and companies that 
are "employee-owned". 
At the very least, according to Toscano (1983), the 
term "employee-owned" should be reserved to companies in 
which (1) more than 50% of company shares are held by a 
majority of employees; or (2) a plan exists whereby at least 
50% of company stock will eventually be acquired by a 
majority of employees. 
----------------------------------------...................... - ..... -...... ------ -- -- ---
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PARTICIPATION VERSUS OWNERSHIP 
There is an ongoing debate within the field of 
industrial democracy concerning factors affecting 
organizational performance. Is it ownership, per se, or 
worker participation that causes high performance levels? 
Dahl (1957) provides an interesting and important twist on 
this question by suggesting that "excessi veil participation 
may in fact have a negative influence on overall performance 
in a business enterprise. This in turn raises the question: 
how much participation and control should there be in a firm 
for its employees to achieve full democracy? Studies 
reviewed here shed some light on these questions. 
Dahl sees ownership as the dominant motivator. He 
b~lieves owners work '0 __ ...... __ .u 1Ii;;.i. UIQ14 
(1967), on the other hand, rejects this explanation, almost 
completely dismissing ownership as a motivator. Berman 
stresses the participation-productivity relationship and 
takes institutional features such as autonomous work groups, 
elimination of status symbols, a single job classification 
for all, selection of own leaders, and dissemination of 
economic information to be the principal determinants of the 
firm's superior economic performance. 
In their survey study of 98 companies,of which 68 had 
ESPOs and 30 had direct ownership, Conte and Tannenbaum 
(1978) support the hypothesis that it is ownership, and not 
participation, that has the greatest effect upon 
profit-related performance in employee-owned companies. 
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Long (1977, 1978a, 1978b) conducted the most extensive 
test of work-organization motivation theory that have been 
conducted in a Canadian 
Long's studies provide 
participation-productivity 
employee-owned-and-managed firm. 
strong evidence for the 
relationship in employee-owned 
firms. The results indicate that employee share ownership 
and participation each had significant and independent 
effects on some job attitudes and organizational performance 
but participation seemed to be the stronger of the two 
variables. 
Hespe and Wall (1976) argue that employee 
participation in decision making could hardly be expected to 
be successful when it is not desired by employees. Their 
studies, in organizations ranging from a coal mine to a 
number of hospitals, reveal considerable individual and 
organizational differences in 
desired participation. They 
the manner and extent of 
conclude that higher level 
forms of participation, though a commendable ideal, may be 
inappropriate where the climate of the organization denies 
employees suitable opportunities to participate in decisions 
seen to be of more relevance to their everyday activities. 
Hespe and Wall further maintain that participation is only 
desired or demanded by employees when it deals directly with 
work activity on the job. 
French, Israel, and As (1960) inferred from their 
research that participation in decision making will only be 
effective if it is perceived by employees to be legitimate. 
More importantly, Powell and 
15 
Schacter ( 1971 ) found 
participation to be largely ineffective in a situation where 
no extrinsic reward was provided. Since employee-owners 
share directly in the success of the organization, through 
dividends or surplus and share appreciation, share ownership 
may provide the extrinsic rewards hypothesized by Powell and 
Schacter and to be necessary for successful employee 
participation in decision making. 
In separate studies of different employee-owned firms 
Goldstein (1978) and Sockell (1985) concluded that 
share-ownership is not sufficient to ensure job satisfaction 
and motivation of employees and that a combination of both 
ownership and participation may be required to produce the 
desired results. Long IS (l978b) study also found that 
combined share ownership and participation are equally 
desired and needed for better organizational performance. 
Review of these studies suggests that we have to be 
skeptical about the organizational effects of ei ther 
employee ownership or participation alone. Researchers and 
theorists have often focused on the effects of ~ither 
employee participation in decision making or ownership of 
the enterprise on workers or on organizational performance. 
Very little attempt has been made to study the relative 
effects of employee ownership and participation in decision 
making on variables (such as productivity and efficiency) 
which they are both thought to affect. There is a lack of 
16 
effort in the literature to establish a consistent and 
reliable relationship between the extent or degree of worker 
control in the workplace and organizational performance. It 
can, however, 
changes in 
widespreaa 
participation 
employees as 
be inferred from the ex isting research that 
organizational structure which generate 
control through employee ownership and 
in decision making, that are perceived by 
desirable and relevant can improve the 
worklives of employees as well as organizational 
performance. 
Industrial democracy must, therefore, create 
mechanisms which sufficiently increase participation 
relevant to the workers' lives on the job and ownership of 
the enterprise. This aim can largely be enhanced by 
establishing an organization 
with direct participation 
which provides its employees 
in decision making and full 
ownership of the enterprise; mainly producer cooperatives 
(PCs) . If combined ownership and participation in decision 
making results in better organizational performance, as some 
have hypothesized; then PCs should be able to show a 
relatively better performance than conventional 
organizations. 
CHAPTER III 
PRODUCER COOPERATIVES (PCs): 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
There is no generally accepted definition of the PC 
and the term has been employed by various authorities to 
include diverse organizational forms. In many instances in 
the literature, the term "labor-managed firm" (LMF) has been 
used to characteri ze the PC, and hence a large body of the 
literature on PCs is derived from the formal theory of LMFs. 
It should be mentioned here that most traditional 
models and definitions presented by theorists such as Ward 
(1958), Domar (1966), Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972), seem 
inappropriate for characteriz ing and defining the American 
PC due to the fact that the models devleloped by these 
authorities are primarily based on the Soviet or Yugoslav 
system of labor-managed economy. It is therefore essential 
to introduce a model of PC which can characterize these 
participatory forms 
economic system. 
following: 
of organizations in a market-oriented 
Such a PC is defined here as the 
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1. The enterprise is autonomous. 
2. Employees are able to become members of the 
enterprise by nominal holdings of share capital. 
3. Sharing of the net revenue by members after 
payment of taxes and the cost of capital. Members 
specify a wage structure and then distribute the 
net residual according to a distribution formula. 
4. Ownership is widely distributed among the 
employees. 
5. Members participate in the enterprise's 
management. 
6. The cooperative principle of "one-member-one vote" 
and "limited return on capital" apply. 
Many would agree that the attributes above include the 
necessary aspects of an acceptable definition of a PC in a 
market economy (e.g., Carson, 1977: Steinherr, 1978: Jones, 
1978: Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
THE ORIGINS OF pes 
We can find a number of studies examining the reasons 
why people join PCs or cooperative communes (e.g., Barkai, 
1977: Zablocki, 1980) or why particular co-ops have been 
founded. However, the modeling literature appears silent as 
to the general reasons why PCs are founded. There is a lack 
of serious and extended attempts in the literature to find 
and test propositions on the social, political and economic 
forces underlying the formation of such co-ops. 
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There have always been some PCs in the United States, 
and interest in them was strong at various times. Saposs 
(1914), Stockton (1931), and Shiron (1972) have documented 
early American PCs. The earliest recorded PC was in 1791 
in Philadelphia. Waves of PCs were established in the 
periods of 1837-1844, 1 and 1880-1914. Each wave coincided 
with a period of industrial depression and substantial 
unemployment. Moreover, it is note\vorthy that within each 
wave, a record number of PCs was established at the time 
when the depression reached its peak (in ter:ns of 
unemployment). PCs then, were conceived by workers to be a 
possible solution to economic exigencies caused by ?.ariods 
of persistent and substantial unemployment. 
Some labor organizations such as Iron Molders' Union 
and the Knights of Labor pioneered in establishing co-ops in 
the 1880's. In the long depression of 1837-1844, for 
instance, forty-nine PCs reportedly started in the direct 
aftermath of an unsuccessful strike by organi zed labor. 2 
Establishment of PCs was included among the first principles 
of some union from the outset, but it was the depress ion 
and failure of strikes that resulted in shifting major 
emphasis to cooperation. 
The number of PCs has historically been a cyclical 
phenomenon. After a rather rapid and sudden increase in the 
depression years, their number has generally had a declining 
trend beginning wi th the end of each depression. In fact, 
once the depression was over, the usefulness of the co-op to 
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workers declined. What distinguishes the emergence of older 
pes from the newer ones, according to Shiron, is the 
apparent lack of "movements" for and 
cooperative industrial relations in 
participatory 
3 
recent years. The 
practical consequences of lack of "movementism" are 
signif icant. Fighting for survival in an often hostile 
business environment, pes are usually devoid of any 
financial, marketing, or educational-promotional help which 
might be offered by a central organization. 
l'lost of the pes which were formed in the 1880s and 
early 1900s were short-lived. Many reasons have been given 
for their failure, including the lack of capital, decline in 
union sponsorship, internal dissension and poor labor 
discipline (Horvat, 1975 and Ben-Ner, 1981). A more 
detailed analysis of why some pes fail will be presented 
later in this chapter. 
Although useful data for some countries on the 
relative importance of pes in different branches of industry 
are available, no one appears to have tested the various 
conjectures 
industries 
about 
allegedly 
the characteristics of particular 
encouraging or discouraging the 
formation of pes. However, according to Meade (1972), pes 
are more likely to be found in labor intensive industries. 
~vaedikin (1973) and Digby (1975) include not only labor 
intensity of the industry, but pcoduct lines in which 
certain management problems are small, e.g., in agriculture 
where the crops do not require much skill in production, are 
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not per ishable, or are not difficult to store or handle. 
Berman (1967), on the other hand, argues that PCs can 
operate most advantageously in industries where labor cost 
is a significant share of total cost. 
Carnoy and Shearer (1980) divide industrial PCs into 
two broad categories: 
a) PCs formed by workers as new firms (job creation). 
b) PCs arising out '_1. corporate divestitures (job 
preservation). 
The development of a cooperative firm as an entirely 
new enterprise, apparently requires a set of conditions that 
makes it profitable to begin such an enterprise and/or an 
ideological motivation to work In a cooperative setting 
rather than a traditional capitalist firm. 
In the United States and some 
industrialized countries, a new situation 
other western 
has developed; 
plant closures, which are sometimes met with workers' 
attempt to run the business themselves. Workers organize to 
buy the plant, often with community support, and sometimes 
with financial help from government agencies and banks whose 
officials are interested in maintaining or restoring local 
employment. The evidence of this case is the recent wave of 
worker buyouts in the United States (i.e., Vermont Asbestos 
Group, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Steel Mill, Mohawk Rubber, 
Campbell Works). Whereas most traditional PCs began as new 
ventures, the majority of the new worker cooperatives are 
the so-called "ailing" conventional firms which have been 
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converted into PCs. 
Cooperative enterprises have also been established by 
governments in order to achieve national and social goals. In 
the United States, for example, in the late 1930s, the 
federal government established 262 co-ops or collective 
farms to create jobs (Infield, 1945). 
THEORY 
Theoretical analysis of the PC (or LMF) is essentially 
framed as an extension of the micro-economic theory of the 
ficm. The theory was developed chiefly by vJard (1958) and 
Vanek (1970) and extended by others. The theoretical 
analysis is devoted to a comparison of the pure LMF with the 
puce capitalist firm. The chief question is whether the LMF 
can achieve the same allocational efficiency as the 
capitalist firm of pure theory. 
Two basic propositions emerge from this work. First, 
it shows that the level of production and employment in the 
LHF would be lower than that of the capitalist firm. 'l'he 
reason for this outcome is that as the LMF's output 
increases, the marginal product of labor declines, given the 
capital endowment and the existing wockers will be unwilling 
to accept the resulting lower wages. with a wage or equal 
pay system, workers in the LMF have less incentive to work 
hard in the same manner that employees of an enterprise with 
a salary system have less incentive to work the optimal 
number of hours (Vanek, 1970). The resulting situation 
Hould be less efficiency, and output comes to rest at some 
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point on the declining segment of the average cost cueve. 
If the assumption of equal income is dropped, the 
inefficiency ot the LMF disappears, as shown by Meade (1972) 
and Sisk (1982). It also disappears if we move beyond the 
simple assumption that workers seek to maximize their 
income. If we add the motive of maintaining or increasing 
the number of jobs, which is often a prominent motive in 
pes, there is no reason to believe that the optimum level of 
employment and output is the one at which profits are 
maximized. The second basic proposition might be called the 
self-extinction theory. Vanek (1975) argued that the 
optimizing LMF will destroy itself. Starting with the first 
proposition above, diminishing returns to labor means that 
income per worker can be raised by reducing the number of 
workers. This causes the capital-labor ratio to be 
suboptimal. 
optimali ty. 
The capital stock is then reduced to achieve 
This sets off another reduction in the number 
of \vorkers, and so on, until the collective disappears. 
Optimal ity is never restored by increasing the amount of 
labor, because that would reduce the si ze of the 
individual's dividend. Finally, there is a tendency for the 
LMF to be starved for capital because of the des ire of 
workers to maximize their incomes. 
These two propositions about the LMF--suboptimal 
output and capital starvation/self destruction--have 
triggered a volume of theoretic literature. One line of 
theorizing deals with the possibility of worker 
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participation in decision making increasing productive 
efficiency, either by increasing worker motivation or by 
bettering the ability of the LMF to tape the know-how of 
workers. 
Ward-Vanek 
This analysis extends the discussion beyond the 
model of the pure LMF to include the 
participatory firm. In this type of enterprise, ownership 
may be either public or private, but workers and owners 
participate jointly in determining policy. Examples would 
include firms with employee stock ownership (but not 
control) and the German codetermination scheme (sitting of 
workers on the board of directors). The basic question is 
whether employee participation has a favorable or 
unfavorable impact on the level of output, capital 
accumulation and efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
The chief studies along thi;:; line are Carson (1977), Aoki 
(1980) and svenjar (1982). This line of analysis is an 
extension of a type of bargaining model in which both 
parties seek to optimize their bargaining positions. The 
result is an intermediate position between the goals of the 
two parties that is determined by their relative bargaining 
power. As might be expected, the effect on resource 
allocation depends on the assumptions made with regard to 
time preference, income maximization, desire to maintain 
employment levels, and related matters. Several results 
have emerged. First, in the participatory firm, in 
worker's comparison with the pure capitalist firm, 
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bargaining power will lead to higher wages in the 
participatory firm, along with lower employment and output 
and greater capital intensity--a suboptimal result in 
comparison with the pure capitalist firm. However, if 
X-efficiency (e.g., when actual output is equal to the 
maximum output, for given inputs) is introduced into the 
model (Leibenstein, 1966 and 1969) the participatory firm is 
potentially more efficient. This is due to the belief that 
a major element of X-efficiency is motivation of employees, 
and in participatory firms workers have strong motives 
(e.g., share-ownership) to reduce such inefficiencies. 
This second result has b~en challenged by Furubotn and 
Pejovich (1970) , Furubotn (1976), Jensen and M~ckling 
(1979). These studies are ~ased on the idea that the 
unqualified property rights of owners in the pure capitalist 
firms are a necessary condition for allocational efficiency. 
Any abridgement of this condition by public authority or 
worker participation in management must be 
inefficient-modified, of course, by the qualification that 
if the abridgement is more efficient, it will be willingly 
adopted by the private owners. 
These theoretic works offer predictions or hypotheses 
that can be subjected to empirical tests. Before examining 
the empirical literature on PCs, however, the type of 
organizational structures that are implicit in the theorie~ 
should be distinguished. 
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FORMS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
We can distinguish four institutional forms of the 
producing enterprise (Fusfeld, 1983). One is the pure 
capitalist firm with untrammeled private ownership in a 
perfectly competitive economy. This form has been analyzed 
in great detail in modern general equilibrium theory. One 
aspect of the capitalist firm that the mainstream theory 
does not deal with, but which has been discussed at length 
by institutionalists and economists of the socialist and 
Marxist left, is the social organization of the firm. The 
capitalist firm has a clearly defined division of labor 
among workers, supervisors and managers, and owners (as well 
as differentiation within those three groups). The 
distribution 
distinguishing 
of au thor i ty 
feature of 
among those groups is the 
the typology of institutional 
forms implied in the theoretic literature on the 
labor-managed 
cooperative). 
and participatory firm (or producer 
In the pure capitalistic firm, authority is 
exercised exclusively by the owners. 
The second organizational form is the capitalist firm 
in a system of collective bargaining. Ownership remains 
private and managerial decisions are in the hands of the 
owners or their delegated representatives. The focus of 
authori ty remains essentially the same as in the capitalist 
fi rms. When collective bargaining enters the model, 
however, optimization of the utility of the workers must be 
taken into account. 
firm. 
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The third organizational form is the participatory 
It differs from the firm with collective bargaining 
in two respects. In some versions, such as "quality 
circles" and related programs for worker control over 
production in the individual shop, some of the supervisory 
and managerial functions are shifted to workers. In other 
versions, such as employee stock ownership plans or 
"codetermination", workers take on some of the functions and 
responsibili ties of owners and/or management. The social 
organization of production is somewhat changed. There is 
also a shift in the structure of power: theoretically we 
would expect the participatory firm to respond to the 
worker's preferences to a greater extent than the capitalist 
firm with collective bargaining, and less strongly compared 
to the owner-management interests. 
With the fourth organizational form, the LMF, we reach 
the other end of the continuum. In this form, workers 
control policy throughout the managerial hierarchy. In 
theoretic terms, the utility functions of owners and workers 
are fused into a single utility function, and a separate 
ownership interest no longer exists (Svenjar, 1982). It is 
this absence of a separate property interest that causes the 
property rights theorists to argue that the pure Lr1F is 
inherently inferior to the pure capitalist firm. 
The distinguishing feature of this typology is not the 
ownership of productive resources since all four types could 
exist with either private or social ownership of capital. 
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For example, the pure capitalist firm (private ownership) 
and the Soviet firm (social o~mership) can be analyzed in 
terms of their responses to the utility functions of the top 
management, which would include directors and officers in 
the capitalist firm, and ministry officials plus plant 
management in the Soviet fi rm. At the other end of the 
continuum, the LMF can take the form of pes in which the 
firm is privately owned by its workers, or the Yugoslav 
enterprise, which is socially owned by worker-manager within 
constraints imposed by limited central planning. 
Nor is this typology based on the presence or absence 
of a particular form of management. All four types could be 
organized in a centralized, hierarchial form (the large 
capitalist firm: the Soviet enterprise: the multi-plant 
Yugoslav firm). And all four could be organized with a 
degree of decentralized control (the mom-and-pop retail 
store: small producer cooperatives in the U.S. plywood 
industry). 
The distinguishing feature is the social organization 
of production and the authority relations it embodies. In 
the pure capitalist firm, owners determine policy in a 
single center of power at the peak of the organizational 
structure, and retain all earnings. At the other extreme, 
workers determine policy and retain the surplus over costs. 
Betvleen these two extremes, in the capitalist firm with 
collective bargaining, owners retain authority and control, 
modified by the bargaining power of workers, while in the 
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participatory firm a portion of ownership authority has 
passed to workers. Theoretically, the capitalist firm 
optimizes with respect to the utility function(s) of owners, 
without taking into account the utility function(s) of 
workers. In the intermediate forms, optimization involves 
both uti Ii ty functions in a complex and often uncertain 
relationship. 
EVIDENCE 
It is interesting to note that there are many 
theoretical assumptions about worker's 
democratic organizations but fairly 
evidence to support the various theories. 
cooperatives as 
little empirical 
This section reviews some of the recent evidence on 
three areas of recurring concern in the literature: (1) the 
ability of PCs to survive; (2) the reasons for their 
failures; and, (3) the economic performance of PCs. 
Survivability of PCs 
Theory has often given scholars 
agenda by failing to point out that 
disappear, not simply worker-owned 
questions about PCs are whether they 
the wrong 
all firms 
co-ops. 
tend to 
research 
tend to 
The key 
die more 
rapidly or grow more slowly than comparable conventional 
firms. 
When the average age of British PCs during the period 
1895-1963 is calculated (Jones, 1975), the average age is 
seen to trend upwards. Jones (1977) also reports that there 
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were cases of American PCs in barrel-making surviving for 
more than fifty years. In a study of American PCs by 
industry (foundry, cooperage, shingle, plywood), Jones 
(1979) again shows that altogether 39 PCs have survived for 
more than twenty years. And according to Bradley and Gelb 
(1983), of the fifty to sixty worker buyouts of conventional 
closing firms in the United States in the early 1970s, none 
was known to have failed by the end of the decade. 
Some evidence also exists, however, that not all PCs 
survive nor avoid the degeneration tendencies discussed by 
theorists. Jones (1982) examines the problems of survival 
and self-destruction in the American PCs and finds that 
survival problems are strong. For most groups of PCs, 
whether or not mortality is greater than for conventional 
firms, remains an open question. 
Reasons for Demise and Degeneration 
From the Ii terature a list of causes of failures of 
PCs can be drawn up (Horvat, 1975 and Ben-Ner, 1981). Some 
of the major reasons underlying such a situation can be 
briefly listed: 
a) Failure of PCs due to internal dissension. Such 
problems can be traced to leadership struggles, 
and lack of common values. 
b) Lack of economic viabil ity due to small size and 
inability to generate internal savings. 
c) Adverse outside conditions. The reason for 
fail ure given in this regard lies primarily in 
factors essentially beyond the control 
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of 
individual PCs. These include ~egal restrictions 
or complications, difficulties within and without 
the wider cooperative movement in obtaining credit 
because of the lack of trust in the PC form and 
conflicts with more conventional firms. 
d) Lack of adequate management. PCs may be unable or 
unwilling to pay competent managers adequately to 
retain them. 
e) Economic success. Paradoxically, success may 
breed failure in a number of different ways. 
When the experience of American plywood PCs is 
examined (Bellas, 1972 and Berman, 1967), one could argue 
that the degeneration of some of these co-ops, usually the 
most successful ones, into conventional firms stem from 
imperfections in the formal structure of the enterprise 
(Vanek, 1975). Of paramount importance is the role of 
equi ty ownecship instead of the preferred requirement of 
active participation (Jones, 1978). Particularly where the 
capitalized value of individual shares in the PC becomes 
very high, young workers are unable to afford to become 
members, and founder members find it difficult to leave the 
co-op without recouping 
workers (founder members 
their 
and 
equity. Two classes of 
hired workers) will likely 
emerge or the founder members will be forced to sell the PC 
to capitalist interests. 
According to some evidence, worker's co-ops that adhere 
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to the democratic principle of "one-member/one-vote" and 
require that all workers also should be members, are least 
liable to degenerate. Some writers such as Zablocki (1980) 
stress the importance of selectivity of membership in PCs so 
that disputes or internal dissention can be resolved 
according to a common set of beliefs. Russel (1984) 
emphasizes the role of culture and ethnicity in the 
degeneration of PCs and argues that strong ethnic and 
cuI tural bonds link present and future members of a co-op, 
and brings about unity and solidarity among members. 
Separate surveys by Bernstein (1976) and Rothschild-Whitt 
(1979) found members in successful PCs to be strongly 
commi t ted to some sort of "collectivist spirit" or 
"democratic consciousness". Such commitments to 
collectivist or democratic values appear to play an 
important role in discourag ing current members from 
maximizing their own incomes at the expense of future 
generations of workers. Common cultural and ideolog ical 
values have apparently played important roles in the success 
of Mondragon PCs in Spain. 
Economic Performance of the PCs 
Evaluation of the performance of PCs is complicated by 
various problems. Studies usually try to compare 
performance of PCs with that of comparable conventional 
firms. In such cases, according to Jones (1978), the 
appropriate level of aggregation is not clear: is it all 
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pes or pes in an industry/area or on an individual 
"paired-firmn basis? There is also the question of 
appropriate criteri~: what indicators of success are useful 
in comparing success either between pes and other firms or 
even among pes? Despite these apparent problems, a number 
of comparative studies have been conducted. 
In his study of Kibbutz pes and private enterprises in 
Israel, Melman (1970) found that according to various 
efficiency criteria the co-ops were more efficient than 
conventional organizations. This was clearly the case with 
respect to capital productivity, with little difference in 
comparative administration costs. Berman's (1967) study 
provides evidence that efficiency in the plywood pes 
(measured in terms of producti vi ty, log recovery ratio and 
profitability) to be compatible with--and in some instances 
greater than--the average for the industry. Jones (1979) 
evaluated the efficiency of some early American pes in terms 
of labor productivity and profitability. For the pes for 
which productivity could be calculated, he found output per 
worker to be greater than the comparable conventional firms. 
Thomas (1982) found that the average performance of 
Mondragon pes (measured in terms of value-added per factor 
of production) to be better than that of the 500 largest 
enterprises in Spain, and generally exceeded that of medium 
and smaller-sized factories. For long-established British 
pes and conventional firms, Jones (1974) undertook a variety 
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of exercises bearing on comparative labor efficiency. No 
obvious comparative advantage was apparent. 
One of the specific weaknesses seen by some in the PC 
form is the allegation that PCs are usually unable to 
undertake technical change and that the more participatory 
PCs are the least innovative. Fragmentary evidence 
suggests otherwise. Construction of efficiency frontier 
maps and fitting production function provided evidence that 
PCs in footwear industry of Britain can undertake technical 
change and that innovation and degree of participation are 
positively related (Jones, 1974). 
With regard to the issue of employment stability and 
labor turnover I Wiles (1977) i.:eports that labor turnover, 
measured by leaves as percentage of industrial labor force, 
is relatively low in the Yugoslav labor-managed economy by 
internationa\ standards. 
It is often argued that PCs are smaller, and if they 
grow at all, they will do so more slowly than conventional 
firms (Atkinson, 1973). In fact, one of the major 
propositions made by Vanek (1970, p. IDS) is that "there is 
a far lesser danger of gigantism--and a corresponding far 
greater likelihood of competitive conditions in 
labor-managed market structure than in just about any other 
economic regime". In an empirical study of Yugoslav 
economy, Sacks (1982) finds it difficult to confirm Vanek's 
theory. Jones' (1979) study of some early American PCs, 
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however, provides partial support for that contention. 
When the ability of PC movements to grow and to form 
new pes is examined, no single answers are yet 
ascertainable. The British and American movements, for 
example, appear to register disappointing performance by 
this token. But a contemporary form of PC in Britain is 
enjoying much more success at procreation. Even more 
startling has been the success of the Mondragon PCs in Spain 
and their growth between 1955 and 1982 from nothing to a 
group of more than 85 industrial cooperatives (producing 
everything from machine tools to refrigerators to electronic 
equipment) with 20,000 worker-members (Gilman, 1984). 
SUMMARY 
Most of the theoretical literature focuses primarily 
on static resource allocation in the short-run and has 
resul ted in conflicting theories of behavior of PCs. As a 
consequence, theories have generated few distinct 
proposi tions for econometric analysis and have failed to 
provide predictions about some of the most important 
problems of PCs--expansion and growth. There is even little 
certainty that most theoretical assumptions apply to 
producing cooperatives. 
The empirical studies of the behavior of PCs have 
begun to move away from the purely descriptive level to 
become increasingly informed by theory. Some studies have 
attempted to test critical propositions about the behavior 
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of PCs from microeconomic perspectives. In most cases, such 
studies are often ill-conceived and poorly executed, and 
results obtained must be interpreted cautiously. 
Any attempt to generalize the performance of PCs runs 
into difficulties due to the lack of sufficient empirical 
work in this area. This is particularly true of American 
PCs. Concern should be expressed in regard to studies 
dealing with PCs in different countries and their relevance 
to the experience of American PCs. Based on the relatively 
small body of evidence, to conclude that all forms of PCs 
are superior in all important respects to conventional firms 
would be premature. Some conclusions are, however, evident. 
For example, the views of some critics on the alleged 
inabili ty of PCci to survive are refuted. And it has never 
been established that PCs are more prone to failure than 
their conventional counterparts. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Shiron, 1972, p. 535. 
2 Stockton, 1931, p. 260. 
3Shiron, 1972, p. 537. 
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CHAPTER IV 
* SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD INDUSTRY 
This chapter discusses the important characteristics 
of the softwood plywood industry and provides the basis for 
understanding the experience of the v!orker-owned plywood 
co-ops. A study of this industry also seems essential in 
regard to the comparative analysis of the economic 
performance of co-op and conventional plywood plants. 
Assessment of the significance of the industry 
characteristics for the plywood PCs is, however, deferred 
until the concluding chapter. Part A discusses the 
manufacturing process and factors of production. Part B 
deals with the nature and uses of softwood plywood and 
current industry situation: and Part C with industry 
structure. The main emphasis will be the Pacific Northwest 
* Principal general references and sources used in the 
preparation of this chapter are the following: Guthrie and 
Armstrong (1960): Mead (1966): State of Oregon Department of 
Employment (1969): Berman (1967): and various issues of 
"Forest Industries": "Forest Science": "The Oregonian" and 
author's personal investigation and interviews with industry 
sources. 
segment of the softwood plywood industry. 
A. PROCESS OF MAKING SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD AND 
FLCTORS OF PRODUCTION 
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Plywood traditionally has been made from an odd n~mber 
of layers (plies) of veneer or of veneer in combination with 
lumber core, particleboard core, or other types of a very 
thin sheet varying in thickness from 1/100 to 1/4 of an 
inch. Each layer is glued at a right angle to the adjacent 
layer. The face (top) ply determines the classification of 
the plywood. One of the most important distinction in 
softwood plywood products is between sanded and un sanded • 
Unsanded plywood panels are made of lower-grade veneers: and 
are often known as sheathing, from their pr inciple llse for 
sheathing walls in construction. 
Softwood plywood mills are of two different kinds: (1) 
those producing plywood only (layup plant) , and (2) 
integrated mills producing both veneer and plywood. Only 
the latter existed in the 1930s. Not until around late 
1940s did the plywood layup plant come into operation. The 
difference between two mills is that the layup plant buys 
its veneer from veneer producing mills and then makes its 
own plywood. Combined veneer and plywood (or integrated) 
plants are the backbone of the industry in terms of their 
number and production capacity. 
Not all softwood plywood plants produce all types of 
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softwood plywood products. Some mills, for instance, 
produce combination of sanded and unsanded, whereas others 
may settle with one or other specialty products. 
Production Process 
The process of making softwood plywood begins with the 
veneering operation, which consists of cutting logs to 
suitable length: cemoving the bark: peeling the veneer, 
clipping, s9rting, trimming, drying and finally passing 
veneer: on to the plywood process. The mechani cs of veneer 
and plywood production is virtually the same throughout the 
Northwest. Differences in operation appear to b~ largely a 
function of the time of construction of the plant in this 
industry: t.he species processed, and the degree of 
capitalization and the opportunity it provides for 
introduction of new or replacement machinery. 
The U.S. plywood industry has been one of the fastest 
growing and most rapidly changing segments of the lumber 
industry insofar as production process and occupations are 
concerned. Sophisticated electronic devices, linear 
hydraulic systems and unique mechanical equipment are 
transforming plywood plants. The advancement.s have been 
made in virtually every phase of manufacturing. 
Microprocessors and programmable log ic controllers capable 
of reliable operation in a plant environment are 
contributing measurable gains to production, operating 
efficiency and recovery. Computer-run mills are estimated 
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to have increased output by 10 to 20 percent at some 
plants. l These new changes are contributing to increased 
capi tal costs, but provide a handsome return on investment 
through reduced production costs per volume. 
A major step toward increased automation of the 
production process in the softwood plywood industry occured 
with the introduction of the automated panel layup in 1969. 
This r=placed toe hand feeding of veneers through glue 
spreading machines and the conventional manual layup 
previously done by a crew of four. A 1976 version of the 
continuous core layup line allows be:tter core utilization 
and tighter control of glue application. With this version, 
the necessary personnel is reduced by ten over two shifts. 2 
The areas that have received prime attention in terms of the 
new technology deal with veneer peeling and drying; other 
concepts such as mechanized layup having gained maturity as 
well. The key word is log recovery. Once peeler blocks 
have been softened in hot water (time and temperatures 
calculated by computer) to enhance their peelability, the 
challenge is to recover the maximum volume and value in 
veneer. Veneer drying technology has also taken off in a 
number of directions which include a new drying concept that 
optimizes energy consumption and drying capacity through 
microprocessor control. During the last decade, the 
development of automatic mechanisms in the panel sizing and 
sanding operations, for instance, have completely eliminated 
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five to six classifications involving six to ten men, 
depending on the size of the plant and number of machines 
concerned. 
All the latest d~velopment of course, have not been 
incorporated into every plywood plant. Some are exclusive 
patents of individual corporations, others are not of 
sufficient improvement to warrant their replacing relatively 
new and efficient machines, and others involve a major 
expenditure not within the financial capabilities of a given 
company. 
Labor 
Labor inputs constitute one of the two largest cost 
item (second to timber) in the manufacturing of softwood 
plywood. Labor cost, like any other costs, may vary from 
region to region. By 1980, for instance, labor accounted 
for approximately 26 percent of rroduction costs per 
thousand square feet of plywood in the Northwest compared 
with only 19 percent in the south. 3 
For many years plywood labor has been considered to be 
semi-skilled, and not highly skilled. For this 
reason plywood workers, along with other wood products 
workers, have been paid at lower rates than all other 
manufacturing industries combined. Table I presents the 
average hourly earnings of production workers in wood 
products industry of the United States for the 1972-1982 
period. The average hourly earnings of production workers 
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in the United States wood products industry increased at an 
average annual rate of 8.3 percent for the 1972-1983 period 
wi th the sharpest increase in 1976 and the lowest increases 
in 1981 and 1982 respectively. 
TABLE I 
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS (AHE) OF 
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN THE WOOD 
PRODUCTS INDUSTRY OF THE U.S., 
1972-82. 
YEAR AHE 
1972 $3.33 
1973 3. \:.2. 
1974 3.89 
1975 4.26 
1976 4.72 
1977 5.10 
1978 5.60 
1979 6.07 
1980 6.55 
1981 6.99 
1982 7.46 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Over the years demand for labor in the Northwest 
plywood industry has been declining substantially. As it is 
presented iI. Table II, employment in the plywood and veneer 
industry of the Northwest has dropped from almost 
thirty-four thousand person~ in 1973 to approximately 
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twenty-two thousand in 1983, a decline of nearly thirty-five 
percent. Recent technolog ical advancement in the softwood 
plywood industry has, however, resulted in substantial 
increases in employee's skills. In general, it is the 
demand for unskilled labor which has declined the 4 most. 
The recent trends suggest that employment in the ply\vood 
industt"y will probably continue to decline nationally and 
regionally, and that the decline may be accelerated by 
further changes in production technology discussed earlier. 
TABLE II 
EMPLOYMENT IN PLYWOOD AND VZNEER INDUSTRY 
OF THE NORTHWEST, 1973-1983 
(IN THOUSANDS OF 2ERSONS) 
YEAR EMPLOYEES 
1973 34.7 
1974 31.4 
1975 28.1 
1976 30.7 
1977 31.9 
1978 32.3 
1979 30.9 
1980 26.2 
1981 24.4 
1982 21.6 
1983 22.5 
Source: Western Wood Products Assoc. 
Statistical Year Book 
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Productivity 
The economies effected by reducing man-hours spent in 
producing plywood and increasing yield from a given volume 
of raw material have a large potential influence on 
production. The question of efficiency or productivity is, 
therefore, an important one. 
Productivity is commonly measured in the plywood 
industry by output (square feet) per man-hour, or man-hours 
per 1,000 square feet of plywood. Use of the 3/8 inch 
equivalent basis takes into account the area and thickness 
of the product, but not the grade of the finished output, 
which determines its value. 
The quali ty of output that can be obtained from a 
given log is to a considerable extent limited by the 
qualities inherent in the log, but subject to this 
limitation, quality can be upgraded to a greater or lesser 
degree at the cost of additional labor time. Profit margins 
are larger for high-grade than for low-grade products. 
Helped by new technology and strong demand for its 
products, the veneer and plywood industry easily surpassed 
the productivity trend for all manufacturing up to 1980 (see 
Table III). From 1958 through 1980, ot:.tput per 
employee-hour grew at an average rate of 4.2 percent for all 
procuction workers. Most of the productivity growth in 
plywood and veneer occured during 1958-1975, a period 
characterized by strong demand for plywood products. The 
high growth in veneer and plywood producti vi ty over the 
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entire 1958-1980 period reflects an average annual increase 
in output of 4.3 per~~nt and in employee-hours of 0.3 
percent. 
TABLE III 
INDEXES OF OUTPUT PER EMPLOYEE-HOUR 
AND RELATED DATA IN THE U.S. VENEER 
AND PLYWOOD PLANTS, 1970-1980. 
__________ ----!..(~19~77 = 100) 
Output/Employee-Hour Employee-Hours 
All Prod. All Prod. 
Year Employees Workers OUTPUT Employees Workers 
1970 83.2 83.0 78.5 94.5 
1971 87.6 87.3 88.3 100.8 
1972 89.8 88.7 95.7 106.6 
1973 87.5 87.5 94.1 107.6 
1974 87.8 88.7 83.8 95.4 
1975 97.8 99.9 80.5 82.3 
1976 97.9 98.0 92.5 94.5 
1977 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1978 101.0 102.2 106.0 104.0 
1979 95.8 97.5 97.9 102.2 
1980 9607 99.6 84.4 87.4 
Average Annual Percent Change 
1958-80 3.9 
1975-80 -0.3 
4.2 
* 
*Less than 0.05 percent 
4.3 
1.3 
0.3 
1.6 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2128 
94.6 
101. 2 
107.9 
107.6 
94.5 
80.6 
94.4 
100.0 
103.7 
100.4 
84.7 
* 
1.3 
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~'Jhile productivity showed strong growth, 
E"llployee-hours in the veneer and plywood industry grew very 
slowly in the 1958-1980 period. The average annual rate of 
productivity growth for 1975-1980 was well below that of the 
overall 1958-1980 period. Ie is, however, important to note 
that while productivity declined during the 1975-1980 
period, employee-hours increased substantially in the same 
period. The increase in employee-hours can be attributed to 
new housing starts and a subsequent rise in demand for 
plywood in the period of 1975-1978: and also to efforts to 
compensate for the decline in productivity growth. 
Caution is, however, necessary in using output per 
the increase in man-hour to measure productivity 
productivity in the plywood industry. 
or 
The rate of increase 
in o~tput per man-hour is not an accurate measure of 
technological advance in the industry. It is the result of 
improved technology and capital equipment and higher quality 
labor partially offset by the progressive decline in the 
quality of available raw material. Output per man-hour 
measures of productivity increase are affected by changes in 
the proportion of the various types of products produced 
because of the difference in man-hours required to produce 
the different types of plywood. Sheathing products, for 
instance, require fewer man-hours input, and it is the 
sheathing plants that are the most highly mechanized. 
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Raw Materials: Timber and Glue 
For many years Douglas Fir has been one of the major 
species used in production of softwood plywood. However, 
faced with a decline in the quality and volume of th~large 
diameter Douglas Fir, the plywood industry was able to 
switch to other species, including Southern Pine, due to the 
development of a lathe to handle smaller diameter logs and 
the solution of the gluing and drying problems with Southern 
Pine. These developments, along with other factors have led 
to a decreasing trend in the use of Douglas Fir as the main 
source of raw material. The percentage of softwood plywood 
made from Douglas Fir dropped from 97 percent in 1958 to 53 
percent in 1976, and finally to almost 47 percent in 1980. 5 
Douglas Fir will continue to be a minority species, with 
old-growth Douglas Fir playing an even smaller role. The 
area of commercial timberland in the Pacific Northwest is 
proj ected to decline by 6.6 million acres by the year 2030 
from 1977 levels. 6 Most shrinkage will be due to wilderness 
use withdrawals from the national forests. 
Douglas Fir for many years was preferred because the 
species, compared with other western softwoods, had several 
important cost and production advantages. ~'or one thing, 
this species is of uniform texture and yields a larger 
percentage of clear face stock than many other species. 
Douglas Fir also cuts easily on the lathe and can be dried 
faster. For years it has been growing in heavy 
concentration in an area which is highly developed 
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commercially, with adequate transportation facilities. 
These advantages, however, have been overshadowed by 
increasing shortage of Douglas Fir as the principal source 
of raw material and the subsequent technological changes in 
the plywood industry. 
Today's logs are small and getting smaller. Over the 
last decade, peelable diameters have shifted downwarJ from 
around 16 to 24 inches to the present 8 to 12 inches. 7 The 
use of smaller size logs in plywood manufacturing seems to 
pose the problem of inferior quali ty. Not all logs of all 
sizes are considered to be peeler grade logs. Smaller logs 
are more likely to produce lower quality products. It 
appears that the gradual shift to smaller logs has had a 
great influence on the pattern of development of the plywood 
industry. Some manufacturers of plywood, for instance, have 
successfully modified lower quality materials ~o that they 
can sell en the market. 
Raw material supply is a problem in the Northwest 
plywood industry. This problem has been generated by an 
increasing shortage of timber and concentration of privately 
held timber land. The share of company-owned timber 
increased in the Northwest whereas the share of 
federally-owned timber declined. In Oregon company-owned 
timber source increased from almost 30 percent in 1968, to 
about 33 percent in 1982: whereas in Washington 43 percent 
of all timber in 1968 and approximately 46 percent in 1982 
were owned by private companies (see Table IV). 
Oregon: 
TABLE IV 
SOURCE OF TIMBER BY OWNERSHIP IN OREGON 
AND WASHINGTON, 1968 and 1982 
Federal Company Owned 
1968 55.0% 27.9% 
1982 44.7% 33.1% 
Washington: 
1968 39.6% 43.0% 
1982 23.0% 46.2% 
Source: western Wood Product Association 
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Other 
17.5% 
22.2% 
17.4% 
30.8% 
In addition to the domestic sources of timber, imports 
of logs constitute another source of raw material. Softwood 
log imports from neighboring Canada have been substantial 
for quite some time. The imported Canadian softwood logs 
have recently been flooding the United States' log market 
and have had impacts on domestic prices of logs. 
Timber constitutes the largest cost component in the 
production of softwood plywood. In 1980, for instance, 
timber accounted for almost 72 percent of manufacturing 
costs per thousand square feet of plywood in the Northwest. 8 
The importance of wood costs varies with the product mix, as 
well as with the quality and price of raw material. The 
share of total cost represented by timber costs is normally 
higher in unsanded products than in sanded ones. Geographic 
differences are also suggested by higher dollar timber costs 
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in some areas. Table V presents the average stumpage prices 
for SaW timber from national forests I by selected species 
for the 1970-1982 period. The average stumpage prices of 
Douglas Fir have almost always been substantially higher 
than the prices of Southern Pine or Western Hemlock. 
Douglas Fir prices have also increased more rapidly and 
reached its all time high of $432.00 per volume in 1980. 
The decline in the prices of Douglas Fir and other westenl 
species since 1980 has helped the Northwest plywood 
producers to compete with the Southern producers, who in 
turn have a better cost advantage over their western 
competitors. 
After timber, glue is considered the second most 
important raw material costs, and accounted for approximately 
six percent of manufacturing costs per volume in 1982. 
TABLE V 
AVERAGE STUMPAGE PRICES FOR SOFTWOOD 
SAWTIMBER SOLD FROM NATIONAL FORESTS, 
BY SELECTED SPECIES, 1970-1982. 
(CURRENT DOLLAR PER THOUSAND 
BOARD FEET) 
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YEAR Douglas Fir a Southern Pineb Western Hemlockc 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
$41.00 
49.00 
71.00 
138.00 
202.00 
169.00 
176.00 
225.00 
250.00 
394.00 
432.00 
350.00 
118.00 
$44.00 
52.00 
65.00 
93.00 
76.00 
57.00 
87.00 
100.00 
134.00 
155.00 
155.00 
172.00 
127.00 
a. Western Oregon and Washington 
b. Southern Region 
c. Pacific Northwest Region 
$20.00 
20.00 
49.00 
99.00 
110.00 
68.00 
79.00 
89.00 
113.00 
200.00 
212.00 
163.00 
44.00 
Scurce: U.S. Forest Service 
In the manufacture of plywood, sevJral basic 
substances are used for adhesive. The most common to the 
industry are blood glue, soybean glue, and phenolic resins. 
Some other adhesives are also used to a lesser degree for 
edge gluing, panel patching and scarfing. Glue is mixed in 
the plywood plant in large, dough-type mixes, and applied to 
the veneer with a glue spreader. 
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The amount of glue 
normally varies with the species of wood and other factors. 
Glue mixing in the plant requires accuracy and attention to 
detail. The basic glue substances noted above are mixed 
wi th other chemicals to the exact proportions 1 isted on a 
formula sheet by the adhesive manufacturer. Deviations from 
the formula or mistakes in mixing can have a severe effect 
both from the standpoint of expensive waste or poorly bonded 
panels. 
B. MARKET AND USES OF S~FTWOOD PLYWOOD 
The softwood plywood industry in its earlier years 
enjoyed a rather unique position, that of furnishing a 
material which could be used in lieu of the product produced 
by sawmililng industry. More and more, plywuod began to 
replace lumber as a basic construction material. The ease 
in which it is handled, the reduction in actual construction 
time involved, and the increased strength its use offers are 
a few o~ its finer qualities. The plywood industry, in 
effect, has encroached on the market previously occupied by 
the lumber industry. 
As shown in Table VI, housing, home repair, and 
remodeling represent the biggest market for plywood panels. 
Approximately 65 percent of the estimated demand for plywood 
was representecd by housing and related markets in 1983. 
Non-residential roof systems, plus industrial uses such as 
material handling, plant repair and transportation equipment 
components are targeted areas of growth. 
TABLE VI 
Estimated Plywood Panel Demand 
By Market, Million Square Feet 
3/8 Inch Basis, 1983 
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MARKET DEMAND CHANGE FROM 1982 
Housing 6,400 +25% 
Home Repair and Remodeling 5,400 + 2% 
Industrial 2,850 + 4% 
Non-Residential Construction 2,700 - 2% 
Exports 650 +30% 
Source: "Forest Industires", April 1983 
However, as new building materials and methods are 
being used, plywood products are ~eceiving an increased 
amount of competition from other products. Just as plywood 
running boards on automobiles were replaced with metal in 
the 1920s, plywood is being replaced with stone, plastic, 
metal, and reconstituted boards. As a result, the plywood 
industry is now experiencing the same marketing problems 
that a few decades ago it forced upon the lumber industry. 
The Pacific Northwest has been one of the major 
producers of softwood plywood products in the united States. 
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However, the significance of this ~egion as the main 
supplier of softwood plyw00d has been declining since 1965. 
Table VII presents so£twond plywood production and 
consumption for the years lY73-1982. 
YEAR 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
TABLE VII 
SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION, 1979-1983 
(MSF, 3/8-INCH BASIS) 
US COASTAL REGION 
PRODUCTION EBQD SHARE 
18,305 10,751 60% 
15,878 8,908 58% 
16,050 8,651 56% 
18,440 9,811 55% 
19,677 10,122 51% 
19,936 10,310 52% 
20,022 9,656 49% 
16,573 7,512 46% 
17,073 6,943 42% 
17,150 7,279 43% 
Source: U.S. Forest Service 
US 
CONSUMPTION 
17,902 
15,340 
15,266 
17,734 
19,408 
19,671 
19,638 
16,232 
16,408 
16,719 
As it is evident from the above table, the Northwest's share 
of the total output has been declining steadily. The 
production level dropped from almost 10 billion square feet 
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(BSF) in 1973 to nearly 7 SSF in 1982. It is, however, 
important to note that the Northwest remains as the main 
producer of sanded plywood products in the Uni ted States 
despite the fact that sanded plywood has been declining as a 
portion of the total output produced. 
The continuing decline in the production of softwood 
plywood in the Northwest is reinforced by the rapid loss of 
market shares for this region's industry. The region's 
share of the total United State's market dropped from 60% to 
43% in 1973 and 1982 respectively. Table VII I shows the 
Western plywood market shares for the four main consuming 
regions covering the 1970-85 period. 
1970-73 
1974-77 
1978-80 
1981-85 
Note: 
Source: 
u.S. 
61% 
52% 
47% 
* 38% 
TABLE VIII 
REGIONAL MARKET SHARES FOR 
THE WESTERN SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD 
(SHEATHING) 
NORTHEAST NORTHCENTRAL 
83% 67% 
68% 53% 
57% 44% 
28% 27% 
Western Region includes both Coastal 
Inland Regions. * Estimated 
Data Resources, Inc. 
SOUTH ~lEST 
21% 100% 
9% 99% 
5% 99% 
2% 97% 
and 
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The Western region's shares of the market declined in 
all four major consuming regions during the 197' -1985 
period. The greatest declines have occurred in the 
Northwest (from 83% to 28%) and Northcentral (from 67% to 
27%). Substantial declines have also occurred in the South 
(from 21% to 2%) and the West (from 100% to 97%). 
As it can be inferred from Tables VII and VIII, the 
Northwest softwood plywood industry has been experiencing a 
period of decline for some time. Two general reasons can be 
presented to explain this situation (Strathman, 1985): (1) 
the emergence and expansion of the Southern industry: (2) 
economic matters. The rapid growth of plywood demand during 
the 1960s provided the necessary incentive for refinement of 
small-log peeling technology and subsequent development of 
the industry in the South. Since its first large softwood 
plywood plant opened in the mid-1960s, the South has emerged 
as a major producer of plywood, and captured most markets 
which were previously served by the Western of the Northwest 
industry. The Southern industry faces a favorable condition 
due to its more recent development, and its geographic 
loca tion close to the faster growing population and hence 
construction markets in the sunbel t reg ions. The economic 
matters concern primarily with production costs and prices. 
Due to a significantly higber labor cost, the Northwest 
industry has been disadvantaged to compete with its Southern 
producers. 
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The Northwest plywood industry is, however, taking 
aggressive steps to diversify markets and minimize the 
effect of the demon hous ing whiplash. Market expansion, 
especially through exports, and real ignment of the plywood 
product mix is the route being taken in the quest for 
survival and profitability. 
Prices of Softwood Plywood 
Price movements of softwood plywood may be measured by 
prices or price indexes for major items (such as sanded 
A-D). The prices of different types of softwood plywood 
sometimes move in opposite directions. 
Movement of prices can generally be described as an 
upward trend beginning in 1972 that continued through 1979, 
with some interruptions in the trend for the sheathing type 
(see Table IX). 
TABLE IX 
WHOLESALE PRICES OF SELECTED WESTERN 
SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD PRODUCTS, 1972-83. 
(IN CURRENT DOLLARS PER 
THOUSAND SQ.FT.) 
Sheathing Sanded 
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Year 3/8 Inch Basis, CD 1/4 Inch Basis, AD 
1972 92.00 101. 00 
1973 107.00 127.00 
1974 92.00 140.00 
1975 99.00 146.00 
1976 127.00 160.00 
1977 157.00 183.00 
1978 169.00 214.00 
1979 164.00 221.00 
1980 155.00 211.00 
1981 148.00 203.00 
1982 135.00 185.00 
1983 154.00 179.00 
Source: u.S. Forest Service 
The increasing trend in the 1970s can be attributed to 
new housing starts in the period 1974-1978, which caused 
demand for plywood to rise. Following this period, plywood 
prices have generally been decl ining. This situation has 
allowed the Northwest industry to somewhat compete with 
other plywood producing regions. The declining price trend 
has been considered to be the result of excess capaci ty, 
technological improvements aimed at reducing costs, and more 
importantly, decline in timber prices. 
------------------------ ---
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C. STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The softwood plywood industry grew at a fantastic r~te 
in the past three decades. The number of Northwest softwood 
plywood plants, for instance, increased from 26 in 1950 to 
116 in 1966. However, due to a slugg ish demand for the 
Northwest plywood products in recent years I the number of 
mills declined to about 90 by 1982. 
The first plywood plant of the Northwest was 
constructed in 1905. Thus, the plywood mills built during 
the 1950s and early 1960s, a period of rapid technological 
advancement, used the developments and knowledge garnered 
through fifty years of production experience. The generally 
declining price of plywood in the 1960s tended to discourage 
investment in plants that were equipped to operate 
profitably only at relatively high prices. Thus increasing 
production was 
productivity. 
dependent primarily on increase in worker 
This in turn helped to decrease the unit cost 
of production and tended to maintain the profitability of 
manufacturing softwood plywood in spite of a declining price 
index. For its own part, the price drop in the 1960s 
apparently helped thE, competitive position of the Northwest 
industry in the building materials market. 
Plant Location 
The early reliance of the industry on its main source 
of raw material, namely Douglas Fir, has to a large extent, 
dictated plant location. The advantages inherent in Douglas 
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Fir as to moisture content, peelability, glueability, and 
the like invited plant location in an area where Douglas Fir 
has been growing rapidly. An overwhelming majod ty of the 
Northwest plants are located in the coastal zone, west of 
the Cascades. In fact, only a few plants are located 
outside the coastal area. Movement of the geographic center 
of the industry from Washington in 1939 to Oregon in 1955, 
appears to have been largely a reflection of interest in the 
Douglas Fir of Southern Oregon and Northern California. 
But there is also the fact that many of the newer 
plants were in some way tied to firms already established in 
the coastal zone (agglomeration economies). The independent 
veneer plant, for instance, locates near potential buyers in 
order to reduce shipping costs and compete with other veneer 
producers. By the same token, the plywood layup plant may 
be dependent upon producers of market veneer and will seek 
to establish as near to them as possible without sacrificing 
other considerations such as nearness to markets and 
transportation facilities. The integrated (combined) 
plywood mills may be somewhat less dependent on the industry 
location pattern, but such mills are often financed by 
enterprises already established in the area with timber of 
their own, or steady suppliers, and a wish to integrate 
timber use locally. Furthermore, the sale of waste veneer 
and cores to pulp mills, board mills, and other chip users 
invites location near major shipping centers and the coastal 
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a':ea 'Nhere such large wood waste users are concentrated. 
Plant Size a~1 Scale Economies 
The No"thw~st softwood plywood plants range in si ze 
from annual C'utput of 15 million square feet (MSF) to 320 
MSF (3/8-inch basis). Relatively newer plants, even those 
embodying the most advanced and efficient technological 
improvements, are still within this range. Plants of 
single-plant firms tend to be smaller than those of 
multiplant firms. But large companies have plants of varied 
sizes. The plants of Roseburg Lumber Company, for example, 
range from 107 MSF to 320 MSF capacity. Sheathing plants 
tend to be larger than sanded mills, but also come in a wide 
range of sizes. Industry sources feel there is no agreement 
on an optimum size for a plywood plant. 
A size distribution of the Northwest softwood plywood 
plants in 1966, 1974, and 1982 is shown in Table X. 
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TABLE X 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NORTHWEST 
SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD PLANTS, OUTPUT 
IN MSF 3/8-INCH BASIS, 
1966, 1974, 1982 
Size No of Output No of Output No of Output 
(Output) Mills Share Mills Share Mills Share 
SM. (40 & Less) 7 2% 7 1% 3 1% 
M. SM (41-80) 47 30% 25 16% 16 11% 
M. La (81-120) 44 42% 41 35% 41 40% 
La (121 & More) 18 26% 30 48% 30 48% 
TOTAL 116 100% 103 100% 90 100% 
Source: "Directory of Forest Products Industry" , 
1966, 1974 and 1982. 
Concentration is noticeable in certain si ze groups. 
Medium-large plants accounted for nearly half of the total 
number of producers in 1982 and their number has been 
somewhat steady since 1966. This size group of plants also 
represented almost 40 percent of the total output in both 
1966 and 1982, with a small drop in their share in 1974. 
Large size plants have increased their number and share of 
the total output substantially since 1966. The number of 
large size plants increased from 18 in 1966 to 30 in 1974 
and remained unchanged in 1982. The biggest losers are the 
medium-small plants whose number declined from 47 in 1966 to 
only 16 in 1982. The number of small size plants has also 
shown a decline; from 7 in 1966 to 3 in 1982. 
The major items of equipment--lathes, dryers, hot or 
coh~ presses--in efficient sizes are within the reach of 
plants of all sizes. They are available in different sizes, 
aesigns, and prices. Most mills above the small size have 
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more than one of each item, except perhaps for lathes. A 
mill of medium-large size has typically two lathes, two 
dryers, and two hot presses. But some at this si ze class 
have only one lathe, or one hot press, or have three dryers, 
a cold press in addition to hot presses, or other variations 
in equipment. A fourth major equipment item (not, however, 
needed in a sheathing operation) is the sander, which may be 
more expensive than a cold press. 
statistics available for 1955 give a total of 100 
softwood plywood plants at that time worth $220 million, or 
an average of $2.2 million each (Cour, 1955). Major items 
of installed equipment listed were 133 lathes worth an 
average of $90,000 each, 185 veneer dryers worth $120,000 
each, 116 hot presses worth $90,000 each, and 81 cold 
presses worth $35,000 each, for a total of nE::arly $47.5 
million depreciated value. At these figures, an integrated 
plant with two lathes, two dryers and two hot presses would 
have a total of $600,000 in these items and at the same 
ratio would have a total value of nearly $2.8 million: with 
three hot presses it would be worth close to $3.2 million. 
The data suggest such a plant as near the top of the size 
range (large). At the other end of scale a plant with one 
of each item would presumably be worth about $1.3 million 
with a hot press, $1.1 million with a cold press. The 
arithmetic mean of $2.2 million would therefore seem to be 
close to the middle of the size range (close to 
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medium-large). 
For the present study, no data on equipment costs or 
capaci ties could be obtained. These costs and values have 
most likely increased in the intervening years. However, 
news stories concerning recent buy-outs of closing plywood 
plants in the Northwest suggest a present value of 2 to 3 
million dollars for a plant of medium-large to large size. 9 
This would indicate no increase in nominal cost since 1955, 
or even a decrease because of the larger capacity of present 
plants and the depreciation factor in the 1955 data. 
It seems evident that equipment capacities or costs 
are not the determining factor in plant size. Plant size is 
probably determined by a balance between the different 
capaci ties of different operations. The output point at 
which this balance is reached will vary and change according 
to the particular items of equipment installed, the product 
mix, available raw material, and other factors. 
By 1972 veneer and plywood mills employed 115 persons 
per establishment, compared with 101 in 1958. 10 This might 
be interpreted as a trend toward larger mills, especially in 
softwood plywood during the 1960s. In terms of the number 
of employees, softwood plywood plants may now fall typically 
in a middle range of 50-350 workers per mill. 
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FIRM SIZE AND INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 
Althougll a few firms have acquired a sUbstantial .:.~are 
of the softwood plywood market, and there are other large 
firms in the industry, no firm has achieved a posi tion of 
dominance. A few laller plywood producers were acquired by 
larger ones in the 1950s and 1960s. However, no real merger 
movements or large acquisition attempts have developed in 
the industry in recent years, and there is no indication to 
believe that such a development is likely to occur in the 
near future. 
Table XI pre6~nts plywood plant ownership 
concentratioin in the Northwest for 1966 and 1982. The 
number of single-plant firms declined from 74 in 1966 to 35 
in 1982 (a decline of almost 53 percent). An important 
finding which may indicate the declining trend in the 
Northwest industry, is the drop in both numbers of firms and 
mills. From 1966 to 1982, the total number of mills 
declined by 23 percent while the number of firms dropped by 
45 percent. There has not been a significant change in the 
nuraber of multi-plant firms. However, the number of mills 
owned by all multiplant firms increased by 24 percent. This 
shows an increasing trend toward plant ownership 
concentration by large firms. There is, however, no 
evidence to support the notion that large firms are more 
efficient (at least in the present industry situation in the 
Northwest) than smaller firms despite the market power of 
Number 
1966 
1982 
TABLE XI 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OF SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD 
IN THE NORTHWEST--1966, 1982 
Mill-OwnershiE Class Total 
Number of Mills in Firms Multiple 
in Ownership Class: One Two Three Five Six and More All Ownership 
Firms 
Mills 
Firms 
Mills 
74 3 2 3 2 84 
74 6 6 15 15 116 
35 1 5 3 3 47 
35 2 15 15 23 90 
Source: "Directory of Forest Products Industry" 
1966 and 1982. 
10 
42 
12 
55 
0) 
-...] 
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large firms in the national forest timber markets. This 
market power is manifested in a significantly lower average 
cost for national forest timber purchased by these firms 
relative to small firms (Mead, 1966). 
Table XII shows concentration in the Northwest 
softwood plywood industry by the largest firm, four largest 
firms, and all multiplant firms in 1966 and 1982. The 
largest firm accounted for 12 percent of the total output in 
1982, up by two percent from 1966. 
TABLE XII 
CONCENTRATION IN THE NORTHWEST SOFTWOOD 
PLYWOOD INDUSTRY, 1966 and 1982. 
(PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OUTPUT, 
MSF, 3/8 8 BASIS) 
1966 1982 
Largest Firm 10 12 
Four Largest Firms 
All Multiplant Firms 
a. ten firms 
b. twelve firms 
Source: "Directory of Forest Products Industry", 1966 and 1982 
Concentration in the industry by the four largest and 
all multi-plant firms is quite noticeable. While the four 
largest firms increased their share of the output from 27 
percent to 37 percent, the multi-plant firms boosted their 
share from 40 to 68 percent. 
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Despite the general 
indications that concentration has increased considerably, 
the Northwest softwood plywood industry has experienced a 
reasonable degree of competition for quite some time. 
Concentration is simply believed to be only one dimension of 
market structure and is not of itself a measure of monopoly 
or market power. Due to excess capacity, declining demand 
and sluggish market conditions discussed earlier, 
competition has intensified in recent years. This is 
especially true with respect to the current industry efforts 
to compete with the Southern producers and ensure its very 
li vel ihood. 
SUMMARY 
The softwood plywood industry exhibi ts certain 
significant features that may have influenced the 
development of the worker-owned co-ops. Among the important 
industry characteristics are rapid growth in the 1950s and 
1960s, geographical concentration close to raw mater ials in 
an area distant from major markets, a market dominated by 
construction industry and hence prices fluctuating both 
seasonally and cyl ically, rela ti vely simple manu fact ur ing 
processes using semiskilled labor but offering opportunities 
for superior labor effort, a variable raw material 
presen ting increasing procurement di fficulties, increasing 
firm concentration, and the absence of advantages of size. 
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The Pacific Northwest segm~nt of the softwood plywood 
industry has been experiencing a period of decline in recent 
years. This situation is evident in the continuing decline 
in output, err:ployment and shrinking markets for this 
region's products followed by a decreasing trend in the 
number of firms and plants. 
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l~porest Industries", September, 1984. 
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3pigures are from the American Plywood Association. 
4"Monthly Labor Review", 100: 1977, pp. 33-37. 
5"Monthly Labor Review", September, 1978. 
6"Forest Industries", April, 1985. 
7hForest Industries", April, 1984, p. 28. 
8American Plywood Association. 
9In a recent buy-out of a closed Champion 
International Mill in Gold Beach, the plant was reported to 
have been assessed at $2.5 million. In another instance, 
workers at the newly formed co-op, Anacortes Veneer, Inc., 
paid a total of $2.4 million to acquire the closed plywood 
mill. Both plants were large and had reported annual 
capacities of 150 MSF and 165 MSF respectively in 1980. 
10"1972 Census of Manufacturers for SIC 2435 and 
2436", Bureau of the Census, August 1976, Table 1. 
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CHAPTER V 
PLYWOOD COOPERATIVES IN THE 
* PACIFIC NORTHWEST 
Plywood PCs in the Pacific Northwest are the oldest 
established organization of producer co-ops which presently 
exist in the United States. They are also the largest, 
measured in terms of number of members and the value of 
production they account for. 
Most of the present plywood co-ops were organized in 
the early 1950s, and by the end of the decade 32 co-ops were 
operating. They accounted for over 30 percent of the 
Northwest softwood plywood production by the mid-1960s. 
But as their number declined to twelve at present, their 
share of the total production dropped to almost 17 
percent. 
*Information and materials gathered for this chapter 
are based, in part, on author's personal investigation and 
interviews with plywood industry sources such as trade 
associations and union officials. 
The principal major references on plywood pes are: 
Berman (1967, 1982); Bellas (1972); Bernstein (1974); 
Greenberg (1978, 1980, 1981); Gunn (1980a, 1980b, 1984) and 
Zwerdling (1980). 
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Plywood PCs have played ap. important role in 
production and technological development of the softwood 
plywood industry. Continuous operation and employment have 
been a feature of these co-ops in an industry plagued with 
cyclical unemployment. 
This chapt.er provides a descriptive overview of the 
plywood co-ops ~ n the Pacific Northwest. A study of the 
history of plywood PCs--their formation, operation, 
organizational and decision making structure, finance, sales 
and raw material supply--is essential for the purpose of the 
present study. Evaluation of these issues will shed light 
on ques~ions concerning the longevity and viability of 
worker-ownec1 plywood mills, and the issues of 
self-management and worker-control. 
A. FORMATION OF PLYWOOD pes 
All of the present plywood PCs were powerfully 
influenced by the establishment of the first worker-owned 
co-op, Olympia Veneer Company, which operated from 1921 to 
1954. Formation of the first plywood PC was initiated by a 
small group of workers in western Washington. Early in 
1921, Olympia Veneer was incorporated with 200 shares of 
capital stock at 500 dollars par value (Berman, 1967). Most 
of the shareholders were of Scandinavian descent. It 
appears that the Scandinavian cooperative tradition was a 
driving force in the establishment of the first plywood 
co-op. There is, however no indication to believe that 
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political ideologies and orientations, or some common ethnic 
and cultural values among workers played any role in the 
formation of subsequent plyvlOOd PCs. ~vhen owner-members 
were asked why they had joined the plywood co-ops, the most 
important factors ci ted were the appeal of the financial 
investment, potential for good income, and job security 
(Greenberg, 1978). More recent research has substantiated 
earlier findings that mmer-members enter the plywood PCs 
with individualist, property-holding motivations and that 
their experience with 
production in these firms 
(Greenberg, 1981). 
the cooperative relations of 
does not alter those motivations 
In its early years, Olympia Veneer developed 
improvements ill almost every phase of the ply\vood 
manufacturing process, which was then in its infancy. It 
was at this co-op, for example, that soybean glue, a 
superior type of adhesive to the casein type then used, was 
first developed in 1927. 
By the late 1920s, Olympia Veneer owned and operated 
two more plants in addition to the original mill. But in 
1946, as nearby log supplies were becoming scarce, the 
shareholders approved the sale of the original Olympia plant 
to a lumber company that had access to good timber. 
Non-shareholder workers had been employed at the two 
remaining plants from the beginning, and by early 19505, 
there were less than 50 working shareholders in these 
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plants (Berman, 1967, p. 91.) In 1954 the two plants sold 
out to u.s. Plywood Corporation (now Champion International 
Corp.) for 15 million dollars in u.s. Plywood stock. The 
sale price represented 120,000 dollars for each of the 
original shares, a sizeable increase in value over the 
initial investment (Berman, 1967, p. 91). 
In addition to providing an example of successful 
cooperative operation, Olympia Veneer set a number of 
significant precedents. One precedent established was the 
principle of equal pay for all shareholder-workers. The 
method used, which distributed the proceeds of the 
enterprise to shareholders in the form of bonuses based on 
the time worked in the plant, was followed by subsequent 
ply\vood PCs. The active involvement of Olympia's 
shareholders in managerial decision making was another 
example later followed by the cooperative plants. 
Despi te the success of Olympia Veneer, no additional 
plywood PC was apparently organized during the first twenty 
years of Olympia's operation. Most of the plyw<rod PCs were 
formed in a seven-year period from 1949 to 1956, twenty-one 
were organized in this period. All together, there have 
been a total of at least 34 plywood co-ops organized. These 
co-ops have operated for periods ranging from one year to 43 
years. 
Although in the mid-1950's, the numnber of plywood PCs 
was increasing at twice the rate of fir plywood mills as a 
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whole, they did not keep pace with the growth of the 
industry in the suceeding years. In 1966, for example, the 
plywood co-op plants represented about 28 percent of the 
total number of softwood plywood mills in the Northwest. By 
1982, however, their share of the total number of plants 
dropped to almost 11 percent. 
The initiative of forming plywood PCs as new ventures 
normally came from three sources: (1) groups of workingmen 
themselves seeking self-employment; (2) businessmen and 
other community groups interested in obtaining or preserving 
a local payroll; and (3) individual promoters hoping to 
obtain personal gains. 
Plywood PCs formed on the initiative of groups of 
local citizens achieved a more favorable start than those 
ini tiated by workers, perhaps because of a better estimate 
by the organiz ing group of the capital and organizational 
needs of the firm (examples of this case are Multnomah 
Plywood Corp. and Hoquiam Plywood which are still operating 
today). Indi vidual promoters were also active in the sale 
of existing conventionally owned companies to \·lorker 
organizations. Such promoters frequently had no connection 
or familiarity with the plywood industry and were not 
necessarily concerned with the viability of the PCs formed 
(Berman, 1967, p. 110). Objectives of the promoters were 
varied. Usually the promoters expected to achieve a 
substantial financial gain from fees, commission on sale of 
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stocks, or other personal gains. Several cases of fraud 
developed in the sale of co-op shares and criminal charges 
were brought against promoters (Berman, 1967, p. 113). The 
publicity of their trials cast suspicion on worker-ownership 
proposals; and this may have worked against the formation of 
additional co-ops. Apparently only one plywood PC (Linnton 
Plywood Association) which was formed through the efforts of 
an individual promoter exists today. 
B. PlywQod Co-Ops No Longer in Operation 
Of the total of 34 plywood PCs formed to date, 12 
remain. The co-ops that are no longer in existence halted 
their operations for a variety of reasons, including losses 
due to fire, unscrupulous activity by business promoters, 
lack of timber supply and bankruptcy. Only a few plywood 
PCs are known to have gone bankrupt, and a few others were 
liquidated. Approximately a dozen were sold to private 
interests and conglomerates. In the 1970s alone, four 
plywood PCs were sold to private investors (Gunn, 1984, p. 
101). Almost all of these co-ops sold were successful at 
the time and making profits. Excluding co-ops that have 
been sold, the plywood co-op I s fai lure rate of 10/34 or 30 
percent after operating periods of one to thirty years 
compares favorably with national business failure rates. 1 
Two principal reasons can be pinpointed for the 
decline in the number of plywood PCs. First, the Northwest 
plywood industry itself is severely depressed. In 1982 over 
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40 percent of this region's manufacturing capacity was idle, 
and those plants still open were operating at 70 percent of 
't 2 capac1 y. The second principal reason is "failure by 
success". Paradoxically, success has led to the 
transformation of cooperatives into conventional firms. 
This is partly because of the ages of the co-ops' members. 
Worker-owners count on the sale of their shares for 
retirement income. If not enough individuals (new members) 
are found to purchase the shares, an outside corporation's 
offer to buy them all at once can seem attractive to the 
majori ty of shareholders. It is the successful co-ops, of 
course, that are most vulnerable to this. The high price of 
their shares makes it harder for individual \vorkers to buy 
them, while their success attracts conglomerates (like ITT 
and Publisher Paper Co., each of which bought a prosperous 
plywood PC). 
Plywood co-ops have recently developed two provisions 
for ensuring their continuity through the sale of individual 
shares. In all of the co-op plarts it is a basic rule that 
the company must have first option to buy back a share if a 
member decides to sell. If the co-op declines the option, 
and the member finds a buyer, the Board of Directors must 
approve the new person (Bernstein, 1974). 
c. The Operating Plywood PCs 
The twelve operating plywood co-ops are all located in 
the "Doug las Fir reg ion", west of the Cascades. Nine of 
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these plants are in Washington State, and three are located 
in Oregon. 
Some of the ~resent plywood PCs built their own plants 
and started worker-owned operations as new producers, while 
others took over existing plants and began cooperative 
operations with plants converted from conventional 
ownership. There are evidently a number of advantages and 
disadvantages faced by plywood co-ops that have taken over 
existing plants. For example, plywood plants sold to 
worker's groups have usually been plants that have ceased to 
be profitable. The wOl:'ker group taking over an existing 
mill has therefore, been disadvantaged by stal:'ting 
operations with an old plant, perhaps technically obsolete 
or in need of major repairs or replacements, that the former 
management could not operate successfully. On the other 
hand, the worker organization taking over an existing 
concern may benefit from the contracts with suppliers, 
customers and contractual relationships of the old company. 
Plywood PCs have been operating for varying lengths of 
time (see Table XIII). The oldest of the present group was 
formed in 1942. One more was organized in 1949. Among this 
group of co-ops one (Anacortes Veneer, Inc.) began its 
operation in 1938 and ran successfully until 1969 when it 
sold out to Publisher Paper Co. (a subsidiary of the Los 
Angeles Times), This plant was then closed down in late 
1981 during the \Wood pcoducts l:'ecession. After fifteen 
State 
TABLE XIII 
PLYWOOD PCs WITH NUMBER OF MEMBERS, 
WORKFORCE, AND YEARS 
IN OPERATION 
Name of Co-Op Membersa workforceb 
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Years in 
Operation 
Oregon: Astoria Plywood 170 235 
200 
302 
150 
215 
310 
175 
165 
215 
250 
150 
175 
34 
32 
35 
~vash : 
Sources: 
Linnton Ply. Assoc. 180 
Multnomah Plywood 152 
c Anacortes Veneer 150 
Buffelen Woodwcrking 200 
Ft. Vancouver Ply. 300 
Hardel Mutual 150 
Hoqu: 'm Plywood 100 
Mt. Baker Plywood 182 
North Pacific Ply. 160 
Puget Sound Plywood 125 
Stevenson Co-Ply 160 
1 
30 
30 
33 
30 
35 
36 
43 
30 
a. Gunn, C.E. (1984). Workers' Self-Management in 
The United States, London: Cornell University 
Press. 
b. Directories of Oregon and Washington Manufacturers, 
1982. 
c. "Oregonian", February 24, 1984. 
months of negotiations, the mill was again bought back in 
April 1984 by its original worker-owners. 3 
The present plywood PCs have "from 150 to 310 
employees, counting both shareholders and non-shareholders. 
Most are in the mid 150-250 si ze range. None of these 
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co-ops operate more than one plant, although a few had 
separate veneer plants in their early years. 
All plywood co-ops plants are located in western 
Washington and Oregon (see map). These mills are near major 
transportation facilities. Five are located along the 
Columbia River which itself is a major waterway. 
Six plywood pes are located in cities with 
populations of 42,000 persons and more, whereas six others 
are in cities with populations of 10,000 persons or less 
(see Table XIV). Tacoma (with a population of ovec 402,000 
persons) and Graham (with population of less than 1,000 
persons) are the largest and smallest locations 
respectively. 
pes operate 
The average size of cities in which plywood 
is nearly 80,000 (in terms of population). 
Three co-ops are located in two major metcopolitan areas 
such as Portland and Tacoma. Three more are operating in 
cities ~ .. ~ch range in size from 42,000 to 51,000 population. 
It may be urgued that the social networks of the 
small cities, in which som~ plywood pes are located, have 
been more conducive in the formation of these co-ops. 
Residents in such cities may have a gceater interest in the 
viability of pes formed and this may have provided a 
dupporting mechanism for these firms. 
Plywood co-ops are mostly of medium-large (M.La.) 
size in terms ~& annual output, ranging from 56 MSF to 150 
MSF. Table XV presents the size distribution of co-ops and 
FIGURE 1 
LOCATION OF PLYWOOD PCs 
IN WASHINGTON AND OREGON 
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TABLE XIV 
LOCATIONS OF PLYWOOD pes 
AND TB~IR POPULATION 
CO-op LOCATION 
Buffelen Woodworking Tacoma, ~'1A 
Puget Sound Plywood Tacoma, WA 
Linnton Plywood Assoc. Portland, OR 
Hardel Mutual Olympia, WA 
Mt. Baker Plywood Bellingham i ~JA 
Ft. Vancouver Ply Vancouver, WA 
Astoria Plywood Astoria, OR 
Hoquiam Ply\</ood Hoquiam, WA 
Anacortes Veneer Anacortes, ~'VA 
Multnomah Plywood St. Helens, OR 
Stevenson Co-Ply Stevenson, ~vA 
North Pacific Ply Graham, WA 
* 1980 Census Population 
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* POPULATION 
402,000 
402,000 
363,000 
68,000 
51,000 
42,800 
9,900 
9,700 
9,000 
7,000 
1,100 
x 
Xu . d . l' d 1 000 n1ncorporate C1tYi popu at10n un er, persons 
conventional plywood plants in the Northwest. The average 
size of plywood PCs in terms of annual production level is 
slightly smaller than the industry average. The co-ops' 
average si ze is about 98 MSF compared wi th 104 MSF for the 
Northwest industry as a whole. It is, however, important to 
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note that the largest plants in the plywood industry produce 
sheathing, which lends itself to greater mechanization. 
Most plywood PCs product little or no sheathing products. 
TABLE XV 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NORTHWEST CO-OP 
AND CONVENTIONAL SOFTWOOD PLYWOOD 
PLANTS 1982. (ANNUAL OUTPUT IN MSF, 
3/8-INCH BASIS) 
* CO-OP Conventional Industry Total 
Size % of % of % of 
(Output) Number Total Number Total Number Total 
SM (40 & Less) 0 (0) 3 (4) 3 (3 ) 
M.Sm(41-80) 1 ( 9 ) 15 (19) 16 (18) 
M.La(81-120) 7 (63) 34 (43) 41 (46) 
La. (121 & More) 3 (2'1) 26 (33) 29 (32) 
TOTAL 11 (100) 78 (100) 89 (100) 
* New Co-Op, Anacortes Veneer, is not included. 
Source: "Directory of Wood Products Industry" 
The present plywood PCs have shown an ability to 
survi ve in a cyclical and seasonal industry. A number of 
reasons explain their survivability. First, they are 
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independent firms that exist to support their membel:'s and 
families, even at reduced incomes. That is the co-op 
membership has the willingness to take cuts in income during 
bad times to keep the mi 11 in operation. Second, when 
production work is slack some co-op members take temporary 
leave without pay and seek employment elsewhere until the 
situation improves. Third, the co-ops concentrate 
production in high-quaL ty sanded plywood, one of the more 
stable portions of the market. And fourth, in recessionary 
periods they respond similarly to their conventional 
counterparts in the industry; laying off their 
non-shareholder workers. 
D. Organizational and Decision Making Structure 
The formal organization of plywood PCs is 
characterized by the democratic and participatory social 
interactions in every day operations. In the plywood 
co-ops, employee shareholders meet annually to elect from 
their number a board of directors or workers council. It is 
commonly provided, in line with usual cooperative practice, 
that each individual shareholder may have only one vote 
regardless of the number of shares owned, and sometimes 
there is also a limit on the number of shares one person may 
own. Directors must be shareholders and receive no extra 
compensation. Directors generally meet bi-weekly, and may 
meet more frequently, especially in times of distress. The 
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Board of Dicectocs makes most policy decisions. However, 
its power is limited by the membecship and by co-op by-laws. 
The Board, for instance, has authority to make capital 
expenditures up to a maximum (usually 20,000 dollars). 
(Gunn, 1980b, p. 399). Beyond that figure, a majority of the 
general membership must approve the expenditure. 
Most co-ops' by-laws specifically exclude co-op 
members who are alceady in management positions from serving 
on the Board of Directors. The officers of the co-ops are 
usually elected by the member-employees for one-year terms. 
There are often continuing committees of shareholders on 
various special problems, such as plant expansion, in 
addition to grievance committees. 
The Board of Dicectors hires the general manager, who 
is responsible for the daily operations of the company. The 
general manager may be a shareholder in the co-op or may be 
hired from the outside. If he is a shareholder, he may be 
paid at the regular shareholder's hourly wage cate for houcs 
worked, or may be paid a larger amount. With the exception 
of wage decisions, the normal day-to-day decisions incident 
to running the business are made, as in other companies, by 
the genecal manager and other melt'bers of the management 
team. 
The obvious area of greater involvement of 
employee-owners in the co-op policy making is in setting 
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wage rates. 
the Board 
The wage rate is a matter for determination by 
of Directors, although members exercise an 
important influence on 
formally referred to them 
the decision, even if it 
(Berman, 1967, p. 147). 
is not 
Employee-owners of plywood PCs participate in making 
decisions which affect their jobs or their plants' 
operat ions. In his study of these co-ops, Greenberg (1978) 
found that approximately two-thirds of a sample of 280 co-op 
members answered "always" or "very often" when asked if 
there was much discussion and participation in the plant 
concerning production, investment, and other policies. 
Although levels of participation vary among members, policy 
issues are widely debated, information is available, and 
none of the writings on these co-ops point to a situation in 
which a small group of employee-owners actually control a 
co-op plant. 
Producer co-ops are generally considered to suffer 
because an inability to discharge worker-owners results in 
retention of less-efficient workers who would presumably be 
fired by a conventional firm. None of the co-op managers 
interviewed by Berman (1982) felt that this was a problem in 
their plants. In fact, disobedience of a foreman's orders 
may l~ad to dismissal or a lesser penalty. 
The relative roles of manager, Board of Directors and 
the shareholders in decision making are different in the 
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plywood PCs than the roles of manager, directors and 
sto~kholders in conventional firms. Although practices vary 
in different co-ops, the Board of Directors tend to be 
consulted and to participate more directly in types of 
management decisions than is usual in corporate practice. 
In addition, according to Greenberg (1980), supervision on 
the shop floor differs markedly between plywood co-ops and 
conventional firms. While one or two supervisors per shift 
are the norm in the plywood PCs, the conventional plants 
Greenberg surveyed used six to seven per shift. Since, in 
the co-op plants the directors are themselves working 
stockholders, their interests and viewpoints are similar to 
those of the shareholder-employees, and they represent the 
employee-owners quite directly. 
Members and Hired Workers 
Most plywood PCs specify in their by-laws the 
requirements that a stock purchaser must meet to qualify as 
a member. These consist generally of an age limit (most 
commonly 50), ability to do the work as shown by a physical 
examination, and approval by the Board of Directors. A 
shareholder who has been approved has a right to a job in 
the plant in preference to non-shareholders. In the case of 
layoffs, non-shareholder employees must be laid off before 
shareholders. 
Almost all of the plywood PCs employ some non-owner 
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workers. The number of these w0rkers varies from season to 
season and from mill to mill. It can be, at peak times, as 
nigh as one-half of a co-ops workforce, but most often it is 
around 10 to 15 percent. Many of the plywood PCs with a 
large percentage of hired workers are companies that took 
over a failing conventional plant. The number of share 
buyers in such take-over cases may not be adequate to staff 
the plant, so non-owner workers are hired to fill the gap. 
Some of the workers are relatives of members and interested 
in temporary employment. Others are basically part-time 
workers hired during peak demand seasons. The members of 
plywood PCs, therefore, constitute the core of the workforce 
in these mills who run their businesses and participate in 
making decisions concerning the operations of their plants. 
Payments and Wages 
Another distinguishing feature of the plywood PCs is 
the principle of equal pay to the working shareholders, 
regardless of the job performed. This was a principle 
established by Olympia Veneer and has been followed by 
subsequent co-ops. The principle of equdl pay is based on 
the conviction that deviation feom equality ceeates jealousy 
and friction that would impair the functioning of the 
organization. In a number of co-ops, however, exceptions 
have been made. The most frequent exception is the position 
of general manager. Exceptions may also be made for other 
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top management positions such as log buyers, sales managers, 
plant superintendents, or office manager. 
The basic method cf pay to members in the plywood PCs 
is the hourly wage. Some co-ops, however, distribute a 
substantial share of the members i remuneration by means of 
profit-sharing allocations. The profit-sharing arrangements 
are based on hours wOl:'ked. 
members, equalization of 
safeguarded. 
To gnsure equal incomes for all 
the hours worked is carefully 
Pay equalization in the plywood 
facilitated by job shifting and rotating. 
PCs has been 
Members learn to 
do most jobs in their plants and can be shifted as needed 
(Berman, 1967, p. 151). Frequently an individual will 
perform jobs in different pay classifications, such as 
machine maintenance or plant clean-up when production work 
is slack. rlJembers also shift principal assignments around 
by bidding for vacant jobs. These measures, similar to 
those recommended by management experts for combatting job 
"alienation", eliminate idle time and iml?rove job 
satisfaction and I?erformance by relieving the boredom of 
monotonous work. They are not readily reconcilable wi th 
different pay classification. 
The effective hourly wage of co-op members has 
generally been above the union average for plywood workers. 
The ability to provide continuous employment to members, 
91 
along with frequent work in excess of forty hours per week, 
has meant that annual incomes of members in the plywood pes 
to be higher than for plywood workers in general. Gunn 
(1980b, p. 395) reports that the annual incomes of some 
members in these co-ops reach 40,000 dollars. He found that 
hired workers receive pay and fringe benefits equal to or 
slightly better than those received by workers in 
conventional mills (Gunn, 1980b, p. 396). 
E. PLYWOOD pes AND THE UNIONS 
The existence of plywood pes has apparently presented 
a puzzle to organized labor. On one hand, union leaders 
think higher wages for members in the co-op plants tend to 
make union members in other plants dissatisfied. On the 
other hand, unions object that lower wages for the co-ops' 
members (during bad times) may threaten labor standards. 
A number of converted co-op plants have been affected 
by the previous company's labor contract. It is evident 
that a conflict arises where a union has a contract in a 
mill that is sold to a worker-owned group whose members 
expect to provide all or most of the labor in the plant. 
Initially worker buyouts were regarded by some union leaders 
as a way of voiding union contracts. 
Union attempts to protect or strengthen their position 
have affected the operation of a number of plywood pes. In 
one instance a co-op plant had to limi t its hiring of 
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non-owner workers to only clerical and supervisory employees 
who were not covered by the union contract (Berman, 1967). 
In another instance where a plywood plant was sold to a 
worker-owned group, the union local demanded to be 
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the new 
co-op's employees. The local claimed that some 350 of its 
members had been thrown out of work to make room for 
shareholders and that its contract with the old company had 
been illegally aborted (Berman, 1967, p. 125). After a long 
period of bargaining the case was taken before the National 
Labor Relations Board, which ruled for the co-op. As a part 
of settlement, the shareholders of the co-op mill formed a 
union which was certified as the official bargaining agent. 
Union action would also appear to have been a factor 
in the failure of at least one attempted co-op and the 
initial difficulties of at least one existing co-op that 
came close to bankruptcy (Berman, 1967, p. 127). 
In recent years relations between plywood PCs and 
unions have been varied. P.t most of the present co-op 
plants where there are a relatively large number of hired 
workers, employees are covered by union contracts. 
Relations of some co-ops with the unions 
The possibility of friction probably still 
4 ~re very good. 
remains. But it 
does not seem likely to become a serious problem as long as 
plywood PCs represent a minor fraction of the total industry 
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employment. 
F. Finance and Capitalization 
pes in geneL'al are believed to be weakly financed. 
Several researchers have pointed to the tendency of co-op 
members to maximize their take-horne income at the expense of 
future investment and income (e.g., Berman, 1967 and 1982). 
Evidence also suggests that a major difference between 
successful and unsuccessful co-ops is associated with 
capital investment (Bellas, 1972). 
The chief method by which plywood pes obtained capital 
was through the sales of shares of stock to the original 
shareholders in the initial organization of the co-op. The 
amounts which were received from this source had been 
restricted by the effort to limit the number of shares to 
the number of jobs expected in the plant. The initial price 
of a share of stock, or of the block of shares required to 
qualify for employment varied from 1,000 dollars to 6,000 
dollars in most co-ops (Berman, 1967, p. 130). These values 
have, of course, increased since the formation of plywood 
co-ops. In the recent buyout and formation of Anacortes 
Veneer, for instance, workers had to buy a 20,000 dollar 
share with a minimum down payment of 5,000 dollars to join 
the new co-op.5 
Almost all of the plywood pes have at some time since 
their organization appealed to their shareholders for 
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additional capital. Securing capital from shareholders 
subsequent to organization has been accomplished in a 
variety of ways (Berman, 1982): sales of additional common, 
preferred and special classes of stock, promissory notes, 
debentures, loan funds, and withheld or deferred pay. Some 
of these plans have been compulsory and some optional. In 
addition, some plywood PCs have other plans to acquire 
needed capital for investment (Gunn, 1980b, 403). For 
example, all of the net proceeds remaining from operations 
after all co-op expenses are paid, are considered member IS 
earnings. From these earnings board members determine the 
size of the two reserve funds: contingency reserves and 
capital reserves. Contingency reserves are withheld from 
distribution and credited to the accounts of working 
members. They represent the equivalent of working capital 
for the co-ops. 
capi tal reserve 
A charge is also made each year for the 
fund. This fund is the primary source of 
new investment capital for the co-ops. 
Most of the plywood PCs have also, at one time or 
another, received long-term loans from outside sources. 
Some loans by the federal government through agencies such 
as the Small Business Administration have been provided to 
these co-ops (Berman, 1967, p. 134). 
Al though short-term credit from outside sources 
appears to have been available, markets for long-term 
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capi tal have not adequately served the plywood pes needs 
(Gunn, 1980b, p. 407). Loans have been infrequent and are 
not usually available when most needed. Real financial 
problems are usually aggravated by the conventional lender's 
distrust of worker management. Two reasons are cited for 
this contention: (1) the co-ops are an unconventional 
organizational form, one in which lenders cannot easily 
identify "the person in charge"; and, (2) given the co-opts 
complex accounting system, commercial b~nks are less able to 
assess the magnitude and legal status of owners'equity to be 
used to provide security for major loans (Gunn, 1980b, p. 
404) • 
Plywood pes record over the years, however, have 
helped diminish the above problems. Loan capi tal is now 
available for co-ops with records of success. Those plants 
which are major employers in a small city or town tend to 
have close working relationships with local lenders. 
It seems difficult to make any useful generalizations 
about the financing and capitalization of the plywood pes. 
Most researchers (e.g., Berman, 1982; Gunn, 1980b and 1984) 
agree that the lack of capital has been a major problem for 
the plywood pes. But it is difficult to judge to what 
extent the problem has been more acute for worker-owned 
co-ops then for conventional firms similar in size, age and 
other factors. 
--._ ... -.- .. _-----------------------------------
Plywood PCs sell 
methods. While at one 
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G. Sales 
their products by a variety of 
time the majority of these co-ops 
probably sold through sales agents under contract, this is 
no longer the predominant method. Sales agency contracts 
were undoubtedly of gceat benefit to many of the plywood PCs 
in their early years, and in some instances the ability to 
dispose of their products without difficulty and obtain 
prompt payment may even have meant the difference between 
survi val and bankruptcy. In recent years, however, five of 
the plywood co-ops have formed the Plywood Marketing 
Association (PMA) to lease railroad cars in order to ensure 
that the member-firms can deliver their products to 
customers. The PMA ventured into railroad car ownership by 
establishing a Plywood Marketing Transportation Corporation 
(PMTC). This corporation purchases railroad cars that ace 
used to ship PMA plywood (Gunn, 1980b, p. 397). By the 
summer of 1979 it owned or held purchase agreements for 900 
cars that were used solely for the shipment of PMA plY\vood 
(Gunn, 1980b, p. 397). 
The plywood PCs have formed few linkages beyond those 
mentioned above. There is some evidence that they have lent 
funds among themselves, and tl~ey have occasionally shared 
management personnel. They have also formed a Worker-Owned 
Plywood Association to study their tax si tuation and lobby 
-_._-_._---------------------------------------
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on their behalf. Although they have the potential to share 
other administrative, marketing, and financial services, 
they have not developed further linkages. 
Since selling problems are often considered crucial 
for pes and in vie\-l of the prevailing shortage of working 
capital experienced by the plywood pes, one may conclude 
that the sales-agency system and the Plywood Marketing 
A~sociation have been the rea~ons co-op plants in the 
plywood industry have not appre'· i ~bly been handicapped by 
sales difficulties. 
B. Raw Material Supply 
A discu3sion of timber supply for the co-op plants is 
important because raw material procurement is a problem for 
the entice Northwest plY\-lood industry and especiaJ 1y for 
independent producers. Raw material supply is not generally 
considered a particular problem of producer co-ops and is 
not, in tne ply,,,ood i.ndustry, a problem pecul iar to th(~ 
plywood PCs. But it has probably been relati v~Ly r:lOce 
serious for the co-ops than for conventional firms, since 
almost all of the present plywood pes are located in 
depleted "old growth" areas. Furthermor.e, procurement 
problems may be aggrevated by co-ops' financial 
difficulties. It is of interest to inquire how the plywood 
PCs have attempted to cope with the increasing difficulty of 
raw material supply. 
98 
The plywood pes are, in general, dependent on outside 
sources for their logs; few of the co-op plants own timber 
lands. When logs are obtained from outside sources, they 
may be bought under contract or in individual lots in the 
open market. A number of plywood pes are dependent on the 
log markets for their supplies. 
The chief source of raw material for the co-op plants 
has been timber sold by the u.s. Forest Service from 
government lands. Raw material has also been obtained from 
timber sold by states and other public agencies. The 
plywood pes bid on timber offerings of the U. S. and local 
agencies, frequently contracting out the actual logging when 
they are successful bidders. 
Like the rest of the plywood industry, co-op plants in 
recent years have had to adjust to the increasing cost and 
lower quality of timber in the Pacific Northwest. By one 
estimate the price of timber increased 400 percent between 
1974 and 1981 (Gunn, 1980b, p. 400). Other figures indicate 
a 1000 percent increase in the stumpage price for Douglas 
Fir in the ten years between 1971 and 1981. 6 Some co-ops 
have experienced severe difficulty in maintaining the supply 
of logs to their mills at any price. Financing log 
inventor ies has also become very expensive in periods of 
high interest rates. None of the present operating co-ops 
have had the capital to invest in timber land at a level 
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that would assure their own source of supply. Federal 
government programs to set aside timber from national 
forests for small businesses have been inadequate (Nagle, 
1979) • 
For the plywood PCs as for the rest of the industry, 
the change in the raw material situation has resulted in 
changes in the products. The co-ops now produce more 
plywood made from other western softwood besides Douglas 
Fir. A number of co-op plants have also moved toward 
upgrading the product and increasing the degree of 
processing or fabrication. The more highly finished plywood 
products provide a greater margin between costs and selling 
price, and the effect of high wood cost is minimized in the 
high priced products. One of the changes made by some 
co-ops was to shift away from sheathing to a higher 
percentage of sanded production. Such a change involves 
increases in patching and sanding operations, and usually 
requires new equipment. Acquisition of sanding equipment 
has been the most common capital investment made by the 
plywood PCs (Berman, 1967, p. 145). 
Plywood co-ops have reacted to the raw material 
situation in much the same way as the rest of the industry. 
The important exception is the movement away from sheathing 
operation. The reduction of sheathing and concentration on 
higher value added products is consistent with the objective 
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of the worker-owned co-ops to maximize labor intensity along 
with continuous employment. 
SUMMARY 
The cooperative model of the plywood pes embodies a 
viable structure for implementation. Despite the lack of 
ideology, a general determination among the plywood pes to 
remain cooperatives seems evident. Although these co-ops 
conform to the cooperative principles, there are some 
problems with this model. The use of hired labor and the 
vesting of control in owners of stock distinguish these 
plywood pes from the model of full self-management and 
ownarship. Not all of the workers who work in the plywood 
co-ops take part in the governance process. Self-management 
is, therefore, not complete because participation rights are 
linked to ownership and hired employees do not have the 
responsibili ties or rights of worker-owners. As a part of 
the workforce, the hired workers in the plywood pes are also 
deprived of profit sharing. 
In the best of cases, 
evidence that workers can 
firms, and in doing so 
however, plywood pes do offer 
effectively operate their own 
achieve the income, secured 
employment, output, and quality of products that are at 
least on a par with conventional firms, and in some cases 
super ior to them. They are also unique among worker I s 
co-ops in their n .lmber I 
and their longe~ity. 
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their presence in their industry, 
The plywood pes provide a \wrking 
example for further development and refinement of production 
that is fully controlled by all of its workers. 
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FOOTNOTES 
ISmaIl Business Administration data indicates that 80 
percent of new businesses fail within their first five years 
of operation. 
2American Plywood Association. 
3For more details on the formation of Anacortes 
Veneer, Inc., see: Oregonian, April 4, 1983; February 24, 
1984. Also see Forest Industries, July 1984, page w.S. 
4This is based on a personal interview with a union 
official. 
50regonian, February 24, 1984. 
6Alaska Consulting Group, Inc. (1981). "Report on 
General and Northwest Plywood Industry Trends, Methods for 
Evaluating Worker Acquisitions, and A Review of the West-Fir 
Acquisition Attempt", paper, Anchorage, Alaska, September. 
CHAPTER VI 
METHODOLOGY 
The subjects of the present study are two groups of 
softwood plywood plants operating in the states of Oregon 
and Washington. A group of eight plywood co-op plants is 
compared with a group of eight conventional plywood mills in 
terms of worker producti vi ty. Both groups of plants are 
engaged in manufacturing similar products, mainly sanded 
softwood plywood. None of the conventional plants under the 
study are known to have practiced any schemes of industrial 
democracy. This group of mills can, therefore, be regarded 
as conventional industrial organizations (i. e., capitalist 
manufacturing plants in a system of collective bargaining). 
SAMPLING 
For the purpose of this study it was intended to 
include as many conventional plants in the sample as 
possible. To this end, the following procedures were 
conducted: 
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1) An annual list of softwood plywood plants in the 
United States was obtained for 1982 (there were 
* 167 plants listed for this year). 
2) Any softwood plant which was not operating in 
Oregon and/or Washington was excluded from the 
list (90 plants remained on the list). 
3) All eleven operating co-op mills were singled 
out and separated from the list of (remaining 79) 
conventional plants. 
4) Any plant for which no sufficient or reliable 
data were available during the 1960-1982 period 
was dropped from the two lists. 
Eight conventional plants remained to be compared 
wi th eight co-op mi lIs. Of the tota 1 of eleven operating 
co-op plants, one was dropped from the sample since it was 
primarily a hardwood plywood producer. Two more co-ops were 
excluded because of the lack of sufficient data. 
As Table XVI indicates, the sample of conventional 
mills selected by the above procedures is representative of 
the total population of conventional softwood plywood plants 
in the Northwest. The eight conventional plants repcesent 
approximately 10 percent of the total number of conventional 
mills in the region. This sample group also represents 
* The annual list of softwood plywood plants is 
published in the "Directory of Forest Products Industry" 
which contains approximately 90 peccent of all plants in the 
U.S.: and 1960-82 is a period for which such lists could be 
obtained. 
- .-- .... _._--------------------------
Size (Output) 
Sm. (40 and Less) 
M. Sm. (41-80) 
M. La. (81-120) 
TABLE XVI 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SELECTED 
SAMPLES OF CONVENTIONAL AND 
CO-OP PLANTS, ANNUAL 
OUTPUT IN MSF, 
1982 
Co-Op Group Conventional Group _ 
Number (% of Total) Number (% of Total) 
o o 
o 2 
6 3 
La. (121 and more) 2 
(0 ) 
(0) 
(75) 
(25) 3 
(0 ) 
(25) 
(38) 
(37) 
TOTAL 8 (100) 8 (100) 
*Co-Op samples are excluded 
* Northwest Industry 
Number (% of Total) 
3 
16 
35 
28 
82 
( 3 ) 
(20) 
(43) 
(34) 
(100) 
Source: "Directory of Forest Products Industry" 
~ 
o 
U1 
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the population of conventional mills in all but one 
class-size category. No small-size conventional mill is 
incl uded l.n the sample. It should be noted, however, that 
the number of small-size softwood plywood plants has always 
been small, and has recently been declining rapidly in the 
Northwest. In 1982 there were only two small conventional 
mills in this region. 
The group of conventional plants selected for this 
study represents some of the more technologically advanced 
softwood plywood mills in the Northwest. This sample group 
includes, for instance, some giant firms' plants such as 
Boise Cascade; Champion International; Willamette 
Industries; and Georgia Pacific. Only t\-IO of the 
conventional plants in the sample are independent 
single-plant firms; this in turn coincides with the 
concentration of plant ownership pattern in the Northwest 
softwood plywood industry. 
The two sample groups of plants differ from one 
ancther in respect to a number of important factors. The 
conventional mills are larger than the co-op plants in terms 
of both employment and output (see Table XVI). The average 
age of the co-ops is substantially greater than that of the 
conventional mills. All of the eight conventional plants 
were built during the 1950s. Whereas four of the selected 
co-ops were constructed in the 1950s, others began their 
operations in the earlier decades. 
Average 
Average 
(MSF) 
Average 
TABLE XVII 
EMPLOYEES, OUTPUT, AND AGE OF THE 
SELECTED GROUPS OF PLANTS 
(AS OF 1982) 
Co-Ops Conventionals 
Total Employees 232 323 
Annual Output 89 111 
Age 37 27 
METHOD 
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Any comparative study of worker productivity on a 
mi11-to-mill basis encounters certain problems, and should 
thus be treated with caution. Problems could arise when 
there are different types of products with different 
man-houe ceyuirements. More importantly, there are also 
questions of technology employed and raw materials (i. e. I 
quality and size of logs) used in production. This in turn 
affects worker productivity and may be different from one 
mill to another. Considerations of the effects of those 
factors on productivity requires, among other things, 
detailed data pertaining to plant technology, raw materials 
and types of products produced which are hard to come by. 
The lack of such data and information necessitates the 
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imposition of a number of restrictions and leads to certain 
limitations surrounding the results of this study which will 
be dealt with later. 
For the purpose of the present study a combination 
time-series and cross-section approach is adopted. The 
model allows the compar ison of the performance of the two 
groups of plants in question with respect to changes in 
annual output per employee over time. 
depicted in equation (1). 
Such a model is 
Q = f (E, YB, E. T , E. T • D ) (1 ) 
vJhere: 
Q = plant annual output 
E = number of plant employees 
YB = year in which a plant is built 
B.T = va~iable E multiplied by a time (T) variable 
E.T.D = variable E.T times a dummy (D) variable (D equals 
1 for co-ops, and 0 for conventional plants). 
The model permits the estimation of changes in annual 
output per employee over time for the two groups of plants., 
as shown in equation (2). 
()Q2 (2) 
= d + eD 
OE"'t)T 
Where d and e are the estimated coefficients associated with 
the variables E.T and E.T.D. Therefore: 
d + e = change in output per employee per year for 
co-ops, 
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d = change in output per employee per year for 
conventional mills. 
A number of assumptions are needed in estimating 
equation (1) and in comparing the economic performances of 
the two groups of plants. The assumptions are: ( 1 ) 
homogeneous labor inputs; (2) homogeneous product outputs; 
(3) equal man-hours worked per group of plants per year; (4) 
constant capital/labor ratios across plants. 
Assumptions (1) and (2) are usually made in a 
ccmparative study as such and seem plausible here. The 
narrow range of tasks and labor skills required in the 
plywood industry and the production of standard products 
such as sanded plywood in the sample plants make these two 
assumptions realistic. Assumption (3), though may appear 
less plausible (since the co-ops might have a different 
behavior from their conventional counterparts), seem to be a 
likely situation on an aggregate level across the two sample 
groups. The assumption of constant capital/labor ratios 
implies that the available technologies are taken to be 
fixed over time across plants. It further implies that 
there a,=,e no scale economies. The technical justifications 
of this assumption are: (1) much of the technological 
changes which are made in the softwood plywood industry have 
been difficult to incorporate into existing plants; (2) as 
it was discussed in Chapter IV, one of the features of the 
softwood plywood industry is the absence of advantages of 
plant size. 
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VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENTS 
Plants output in the two sample groups are measured in 
terms of total annual production in million square feet, 
3/8-inch basis. 
E 
E is defined as the reported average monthly number of 
employees per year for each plant. The relationship between 
Q and E, as postulated in the model, is a positive one, 
meaning that output is expected to rise as input of labor 
increases. 
YB 
YB is the year in which a plant was built or actually 
began its operation. As it was noted earlier, the 
relationship between technology employed and output (or 
productivity) is an important one. The insertion of 
variable YB in the same model can loosely account for the 
effects of technological factors on output levels 
independent of labor inputs. Newer plants are assumed to 
have employed production technologies more suited to changes 
in raw material situations (i.e., smaller logs) discussed in 
Chapter IV. This leads to the expectation of finding 
relatively greater output in newer plants than in older 
ones. 
III 
E.T 
Variable E.T is composed of the interaction of number 
of employees (E) for each plant and a time variable (T). 
The time variable takes the value of (1) for the first 
observation and ends with the value of (23) for the 
twenty-third observation. R.T permits the estimation of 
changes in annual output per employee over time, as depicted 
in equation (2). 
E.T.D 
This is a variable designated to (a) distinguish the 
co-op plants from the conventional ones: (b) account for the 
changes in annual output per employee over time 
independently in each group of mills (as shown in equation 
2). E.T.D is composed of the multiplications of variable E, 
the time variable (T), and the dummy variable (D). 
DATA 
Secondary data pertaining to the annual output, number 
of employeesl and years of construction of the sample mills 
were obtained from the following sources: 
A. Directory of Forest Products Industry--plants' 
annual output. 
B. Oregon Directory of manufacturers --number of 
employees. 
c. Washington Directory of Manufacturers--number of 
employees and plants' years of construction. 
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D. Oregon Department of Economic Development--number 
of employees and plants' years of construction. 
E. International Woodworkers of America (IWA)--number 
of employees and plants' output. 
Information ana data obtained from source A through E 
were originally gathered by those organizations and sources 
in mail questionnaires which were directly sent to the 
general managers of plywood plants throughout the United 
States. IWA is a union organization representing employees 
of a number of plants in the two sample groups. 
Data for a number of plants were not available, and 
several mills had missing data for a significant number of 
years. This situation resulted in the exclusion of the 
concerned plants from the samples. In addition, a careful 
inspection of some plants' data, and an examination of 
residuals (as measures of the error component) revealed 
serious "outliers" or "deviant cases" visible in the 
scatterplot. This examination led to the exclusion of the 
affected mills from the samples. 
CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIO~0 
Regression estimates are presented in equation 3 (with 
t-statistics in parentheses). All of the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
Q = -1045 + O.l1SE + 0.555YB + 0.00789E.T. + 0.00144E.T.D (3) 
(9.6) (4.2) 2 (14.4) (2.08) 
N=368 R =0.65 F=170 
output has shown to be positively associated with the 
number of employees indicating I for example I that plants' 
annual production levels would increase by 118 thousand 
square feet (TSF) as an additional worker is employed. This 
is equivalent of the marginal output per employee. The 
positive coefficient of YB reveals that newer plants tend to 
be more productive than older ones by 555 TSF per year in 
age difference. This may be interpreted that newer plants 
have likely employed better and newer technologies which 
helped to produce greater output. The average output per 
employee (or average product of labor) for all plants 
combined is found to be 359 TSF. 
Using equation (3) I the growth in annual output per 
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employee per year in tht;! co-op and conventional plants are 
derived as follows: 
Co-Ops: ()Q2 = 0.00789 + 0.00144 = 0.00933 
oE'C>T 
Conventionals : ()Q2 = 0.00789 
()EoT 
(4 ) 
( 5) 
That is, whi Ie annual output per employee increased each 
year by an estimated 9,330 SF in the co-ops, it did so only 
by 7,890 SF in the conventional mills. The co-op plants 
have shown an almost 18 percent greater growth in annual 
output per employee per year than their conventional 
counterparts. 
In order to explore other differences in peformance 
between the two groups of plants three separate pooled 
time-series cross-section regressions are run: (1) a 
regression for the co-op plants; (2) a regression for the 
conventional mills; (3) a regression of combined co-ops and 
conventional plants for a Chow-test of equality between two 
sets of equations. For this purpose the variable E.T.D 
(which was to distinguish the co-ops from those of the 
conventional mills) is drop~ed from the model. The 
estimated equations (with t-statistics in parentheses) and a 
summary of the statistical findings (shown in table XVI) are 
presented below: 
* * * Co-Ops: Q= -1059 + 0.185E + 0.555YB + 0.0089E.T. (6 ) 
(8.9) (4.9) (13.4) 
N = 184 2 R = 0.69 F = 139 
us 
* ** * Conventionals:Q= -S220 + 0.099E + 2.691YB + 0.008E.T (7) 
(S.7) (1.5) (11.2) 
2 N = 184 R = 0.56 F = 77 
* * * Combined: Q= -748+0.109E+0.40SYB+O.00838E.T (8) 
(9.4) (3.7) (16.8) 
2 N = 368 R = 0.64 F = 223 
* Significant at 0.01 
**significant at 0.1 
TABLE XVII 
SUMMARY OF THE STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
(derived from equations 6, 7, 9 and 10) 
Co-Ops Ccnventionals 
Average Output Per Employee (TSF) 383 
Marginal Output per Employee (TSF) 185 
Growth in Output per Employee per Year 8,900 
(SF) 
343 
99 
8,000 
The estimated growth in annual output per employee per year 
in each group of plants can be derived from equations (6) 
and (7) as follows: 
CO-Ops: 
= 0.0089 (9 ) 
Conventionals: = 0.008 (lO) 
That is annual output per employee grew by 8,900 SF 
per year in the co-ops compared with 8,000 SF in the 
conventional plants. These findings are consistent with 
productivity results obtained earlier in equations (4) and 
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(5). A comparison of the estimated coefficients of E's in 
the two sample groups (eq~ations 6 and 7) suggests that the 
relationship between output (Q) and number of employees (E) 
is much stronger in the co-ops than in the conventional 
plants. Each additional worker employed in the co-ops 
results in an estimated 185 TSF increase in annual output 
compared with 99 TSF in the conventional mills. That is, 
the co-ops' estimated marginal o~tput per effiployee is almost 
two times greater than that of the conventional plants. It 
is also found that the average output per employee is to be 
383 TSF and 343 TSF in the co-ops and conventional plants 
respectively. Variable YB has shown to have a significant 
positive effect on output in both groups of mills, although 
this effect appears to be much greater in the conventional 
group. The coefficients of YB's in the two groups of mills 
indicate that: (1) newer co-ops are more productive than 
older ones by 555 TSF for each year in age difference: (2) 
newer conventional plants are more productive than older 
ones by 2,691 TSF for each year in age difference. This 
implies that the differences in technologies used in the 
co-ops are, on a mill-to-mill basis, less pronounced than 
the differences in technologies employed in the conventional 
plants. 
As the results suggest, the two groups of plants have 
shown differences in their performance. Whether those 
differences are statistically significant or not requires a 
Chow-test of equality between sets of coefficients in 
--~------------------------------
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equations of co-ops and conventional plants. The intent 
is to test the null hypothesis that the set of coefficients 
in equations (6) and (7) are equal to the set of coefficients 
in equation (8). The Chow-test is given as the following: 
F K+l,m-2k-2 = 
ESS - (ESS + ESS )/k+l 
cm cp cv (11 ) 
(ESS + ESS )/m-2k-2 
cp cv 
~vhere k = number of variables in the model 
m = sum of observations in the two sample groups 
K+l,m-2K-2 = degrees of freedom 
ESS = cp error sum of squares for co-op equation (6 ) 
ESS = error sum of squares for conventional cv 
equation (7 ) 
ESS = error sum cm of squares for combined equation (8 ) 
As parts of the regressions 
ESS = 37698; 
cp 
Therefore, 
ESS 
cv = 
output it 
86010; and 
is found 
ESS = 1284SO 
cm 
F5 ,358 = 128450 - (37698 + 86010)/5 = 2.74 (37698 + 86010)/358 
that 
Since the value of the F-statistics is greater than 
the critical value of the F distribution at the 0.05 level, 
we reject the null hypothesis. That is the differences 
in performance of the two groups of plants (found in this 
study) are statistically significant. The implication 
is that the co-op plants differ in their operation or 
behavior from the conventional mills. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study has provided evidence of the extent 
cooperative and conventional plywood plants differ in their 
performance. The important question which arises here is: 
what accounts for the apparent differences in these plants' 
operations? Ideally, such a question could ce answered with 
more certainty if the estimated production functions of the 
two groups of plants were compared. Therefore, explanations 
and interpretations presented here should be treated with 
caution. 
Lacor input (E) is found to have a much stronger 
effect en output (Q) in the co-ops than in the case of 
conventional mills. The explanation may be that the co-ops 
follow a labor-using expansion path whereas their 
conventional ccunterparts follow a capital-using expansion 
path. This means that while the co-op plants might increase 
their output more through the use of labor, the conventional 
mills may expand their production more by the use of capital 
(e.g., new machines or equipment). The use of temporary and 
seasonally hired workers in the co-ops has likely provided 
the means of expanding output in these plants whenever 
needed without much investments in new machines. This 
flexibility and frequent acjustment of labor inputs may not 
have been available in the conventional mills (perhaps 
because of union contracts). It is, however, not very clear 
as to why marginal output per employee is greater in the 
co-ops. One explanation may be that the production processes 
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are more capital intensive in the co-ops than in their 
conventional counterparts. A second explanation arises from 
the differences in wage rates in the two groups of plants. 
One may argue that any additional worker who would be 
employed in the co-ops would most likely be a 
nonowner-employee who does not receive the same financial 
benefits as an ownec-employee does. Such a hired employee 
may then have less incentive to work as hard as an 
owner-employee does. However, wage rates of hired employees 
in some co-op plants are generally known to have been higher 
than those ceceived in the conventional plants. The greater 
wage rates in the co-ops may have provided the hired workers 
the incentive to work compacati vely harder and better than 
employees in the conventional mills. This situation 
probably has resulted in a higher marginal output/worker in 
the co-ops. 
The technological factoc (variable YB) has shown to 
have a more profound 
conventional plants than 
means that the extent of 
impact on output (Q) of 
that of the co-op mills. 
technological differences, 
the 
This 
on a 
mill-to-mi11 basis, is less pconounced in the co-op plants 
than in the conventional group despite the fact that the 
co-ops have a greater age variance. This can be explained 
by the age difference between the two groups of plants. The 
co-ops ace significantly older than the conventional mills. 
All samples of conventional plants were built between 1955 
and 1959. Technologies which were available to plywood 
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plants in that period wece most likely moce advanced than 
the ones which could have been obtained in earl iec decades 
(in which some co-ops were establ ished) . The age pat teen 
effects concecning the two gcoups of plants has likely 
contcibuted to a lower marginal product of capital in the 
co-op mills. 
The growth in output pee employee pee yeac is found to 
be gceater in the co-ops than in theic conventional 
countecpacts. This could be attcibuted to the genecal 
bel ief that owners wock better and hardec than non-ownecs. 
Employee-membecs in the plywood co-ops, who in essence own 
and run their enterpcises, ace more likely to wock hacdec 
and take better cace of their plants or equipment since they 
have a stronger motivation, reinforced by both participatocy 
atmosphere and incentive of dicect financial gain (in the 
forms of share pcofits and/or higher wages as their 
companies prospec). Such a situation has likely contributed 
to the higher labor productivity found in the co-op plants. 
This is a proposition which has been supported by a number 
of studies concerning pes. 
Productivity in the plywood plants is generally 
affected by three major factors; technology I raw material, 
and labor efforts. It is important to discuss the findings 
of this study in cespect to situations in which two of the 
crucial assumptions made in this research are alteced. 
- Breaking the assumption of equal man-houcs worked. 
Annual output per employee, which is used as a measure of 
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productivity, does not account for the differences in 
man-hours worked in each plant (or groups of plants). One 
may simply attribute the higher output per employee ratio of 
the plywood pes to a greater number of hours worked in these 
mills. If that is found to be the case, it could still be 
regarded as an indicator of success for the co-ops since it 
is consistent with the objectives of the worker-owned firms: 
mainly steady employment and higher income. In such a 
si tuation it may then be viewed that the co-ops rely on 
members' hard work and sacrifices (such as longer work hours 
with perhaps no additional payment) to achieve greater 
output. The results of such sacrifices may show up in the 
form of higher annual shared-profits for the co-ops' 
members. 
Breaking the assumption of fixed technology. If 
technology has changed over time in the sample plants and 
given all other assumptions held, the higher worker 
productivity of co-ops may imply the adaptation of better 
(or more capital intensive) technolog ies by these mills. 
In the case of changing technologies, marginal output per 
employee cannot be estimated (as it was in this study) 
independent of technological factors. 
If the two groups of plants have used entirely 
different species of timber in their production, then the 
greater productivity found in the co-ops may imply the use 
of higher quality logs (or more suitable technologies) in these 
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mills. This, in turn might have resulted in a greater log 
recovery ratio (output per input of logs) in the co-ops. 
Such a case may then be regarded as an indicator of better 
performance on the part of log buyer or management of the 
co-op plants. 
It seems evident that even under some hypothetical 
condi tions presented above, the outcomes tend to suggest 
bet ter economic performance by the plywood co-op plants. 
The results and interpretations reported here indicate that 
the higher worker productivity in the co-ops is probably the 
result of the combined effects of better production 
processes; more suitable raw materials; and more 
importantly, better labor efforts. 
Concerns and reservations should be expressed about 
the use of annual output per employee as a measure of worker 
producti vi ty in this study. This measure of producti vi ty 
does not permit for the separation of production workers 
from nonproduction employees. It is likely that the 
conventional sample plants, especially the larger ones, to 
have employed more of nonproduction employees compared with 
the co-op mills where some nonproduction tasks may be 
performed by a production worker on a day-to-day basis. In 
such a situation, the use of annual output per employee 
would automatically result in a lower worker producti vi ty 
figure for the conventional mills (since the output has been 
produced by a relatively smaller number of production 
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\vorkers) • Another issue arises from the adaptation of an 
aggregate method of comparing worker productivity in the two 
groups of plants. The aggregate approach does not allow the 
comparison of the two groups of plants on a mill-to-mill 
basis. In other words, it is not clear whether worker 
productivity is greater on an individual basis for all eight 
co-op plants than in every other conventional sample mill. 
In general, results reported here should be taken 
cautiously. 
It seems appcopriate to add a discussion on how 
a comparative study as such could be undertaken under a 
situation where no limitations were present on the data. 
As it was mentioned earlier, a standard approach to 
looking for differences in efficiency (and productivity) 
between two groups of plants is that of estimating 
production functions. A typical statistical form is the 
Cobb-Douglas equation which can be transformed into a 
log-linear form with three inputs of labor, capital and 
* logs (as a source of raw material). For the purpose of 
analyzing factor productivity, it is necessary to measure 
all inputs in terms of their physical quantities, assuming 
that they are homogeneous resources. Physical capital in 
the form of fixed investment in plant and equipment can be 
* Log Q = log a + b Log L + clog K + d log G 
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measured in constant dollars. 1'lanhours worked may be a 
valid measure of change in real labor services. It is a 
superior measure (against manhours paid), since the trend 
toward more vacation, sick time, and other fringe benefits 
does bias the hours paid data (since it is not productive 
time). One of the important questions to be asked is 
whether the labor input should include all workers or only 
those actively engaged in production. It seems appropriate 
to embody only production workers for this purpose. 
Physical raw material may be measured by the volume (board 
feet) of logs consumed in production. 
The estimated production sets for the two groups of 
plants can be compared on an input-by-input basis as well as 
for overall productive efficiency for any level of resource 
use, to establish productive claim by type of plants. 
Several useful information pertinent to the operations and 
performances of the two groups of plants can be inferred 
from the estimated parameters of their production functions. 
Marg inal products of labor and capi tal in the two sample 
plants can be compared for the purposes of inputs intensity 
and productivity. It can be learned, for example, that 
which group of plants (pes or conventionals) are more labor 
or capital intensive. The estimated technical coefficients 
may then be used to estimate returns to scale in order to 
evaluate efficiency (and its relation to plant size) in the 
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two groups of mills. Coefficients of raw material (logs) in 
the two production functions pertinent to each group of 
plants would also allow the comparison of log recovery 
ratios (as a measure of wood utilization) for efficiency 
purposes. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The major conclusion that emerges from this study is 
that worker-owned plywood cooperatives are a viable and 
productive form of economic organization that utilize labor 
inputs efficiently and in doing so can achieve higher worker 
productivity than conventional enterprises. In general, the 
findings reported here refute those propositions such as 
that of Vanek's (1970) which maintain that with an equal pay 
system employees in PCs have less incentive to work hard, 
and the resulting situation is lower worker productivity 
compared with conventional organizations. Although the 
levels of employment and output, as Vanek has hypothesized, 
are lower in PCs of the plywood industry, this has not 
evidently resulted in a misallocation of labor inputs in 
these enterprises. 
With eleven co-ops having existed for periods canging 
from thirty to forty-five years, plywood PCs have met the 
test of survival and demonstrated that they can perform the 
necessary functions of business enterprise in a competitive 
economic society. The co-ops have not only coped with the 
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usual problems of business but, in some cases, have done so 
under additional handicaps not part of normal market 
hazards, such as unrealistic or even fradulent promotion, 
inadequate capitalization, obsolete plant at the start of 
operation, or 
relationships. 
restrictive nonbeneficial contractual 
The variety of policies and practices 
pursued by some co-ops indicates that the worker-owned 
organizational form has flexibility. Adaptability has been 
shown by the ability to meet changing situations, a capacity 
necessitated to an unusual extent by the significant 
development in the plywood industry since the mid-1950s. 
To say that worker-owned cooperatives are a viable 
form of business organization is not to say that this form 
automatically guarantees success of an enterprise. A close 
review of the experience of plywood pes suggests that good 
business operation is required for the success of pes no 
less than for that of conventional enterprises. Adequate 
capitalization, plant and equipment and raw material supply, 
and sound policies with respect to finance, job management, 
sales and supply as well as production are as necessary for 
the success of a worker-owned co-op as for that of any other 
manufacturing organization. Even the higher worker 
productivity that is found in the plywood pes is not 
automatically achieved but requires solid hard effort, work 
discipline, and efficient management. 
The rather unusual concentration of co-ops in the 
softwood plywood industry may suggest the possibility that 
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this industry is peculiacly favorable to cooperative 
enterprise. Whether the industry is so uniquely suited to 
worker-owned operation that the experience of plywood pes 
cannot be considered relevant elsewhere is a question that 
must now be considered. 
There are evidently a number of characteri~tics 
inherent in the softwood plywood industry that may be 
considered as both favorable and unfavorable to production 
by worker-owned co-ops. One fe-vorable (though chang ing) 
feature of the industry is perhaps the relatively low 
capital requirement. The ability of a group of workers to 
raise adequate capital for a manufacturing venture from 
their own resources is limi ted. A plywood plant 
representing an investment of three million to five miJ.lion 
dollars and employing 50 to 350 workers is li~ely more 
promising for a cooperative venture than say, a petroleum 
refinery with 65,000 dollars invested per worker. l But in 
relation to the whole array of manufacturing enterpri se, 
plywood plants do not appear uniquely small in terms of 
capital requirement. The great bulk of the United States 
manufacturing corpurations have assets of less than five 
million dollars. With respect to capital requirements in 
relation to labor, the plywood industry is close to the 
average for manufacturing as a whole. 2 And plywood plants 
are not signi ficantly below the norm in number of workers. 
In 1977, for instance, there were approximately 78,000 
manufacturing units with total employess of 20 to 99 per 
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establishment. 3 
Another feature of the softwood plywood industry that 
may be favorable to cooperative ventures is the 
comparatively low-skilled nature of jobs in a plywood plant 
and the comparatively narrow range of skills required I and 
hence the relative narrow range of pay di fferentials. But 
in relation to the whole array of manufacturing activities, 
skill requirements in the plywood industry are not uniquely 
low. In 1983 there were nearly 28 million manufacturing 
occupations in the united States classified as 
semi-skilled. 4 
Comparative lack of highly trained and highly paid 
skills is probably favorable to cooperative operations in 
several ways. Perhaps the most important result is a 
widening of the market for working shares in co-ops. Since 
plywood plant skills can be learned on the job, the plywood 
PCs have not been limited in their membership to workers 
already in the industry or people with certain specific 
skills. They have been able to draw members from all those 
physically able to work who have the necessary capital and 
desire to join. However, in more skilled industries, 
arrangements could probably be made for assigning unskilled 
new members to unskilled jobs while they were training to 
acquire the needed skill, as is done in the plywood co-ops. 
Finally, a narrow range of skills probably makes more 
acceptable the practice of equal pay for all jobs 
that has been considered a cooperative principle in the 
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plywood PCs. It should be recalled that plywood plants do 
require a certain range of skills sufficient to warrant pay 
differentials. 
Although a wide range of skills might pose problems 
for PCs, a process requicing only unskilled labor would 
perhaps be unsuitable for cooperative operations. PCs 
evidently rely on higher labor productivity in manufacturing 
to overcome difficulties they may have in other departments 
such as finance or marketing. In unskilled jobs there will 
be less opportuni ty for superior producti vi ty to be 
achieved. In the plywood industry, although most jobs are 
classified as only semi-skilled, some care and judgment are 
required, and productivity can show up in improved quality 
as well as greater quantity of output. 
The major disadvantage of the softwood plywood 
industry for cooperative production stems from two 
characteristics of the industry: the nature of its markets 
and the nature of its raw material. The entrepreneurial 
problem.s faced by a PC in dealing wi th an unstable market 
and unstable raw materials supply counteract the 
simplification of the entrepreneurial 
relatively standardized product and 
manufacturing operation. 
job derived from a 
simplicity of the 
PCs, with their interest in continuous operation, 
would seem likely to flourish best in an industry with a 
stable demand. But because softwood plywood is used largely 
in construction, demand for plywood products is highly 
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seasonal and also subject to strong cyclical variation. 
Furthermore, the products are difficult to store so that 
production is commonly for immediate sales. In the face of 
the variable demand, continuous operation is more difficult 
for a PC to maintain. In addition, price fluctuations 
resulting from the demand situation makes it difficult for 
worker-owned operations to achieve the steady income 
required to meet the need of their members for steady pay. 
Some of the difficulties in connection with raw 
rna terial suppl ies have al ready been mentioned: the 
increasing scarcity of 
independent producers, 
high-grade supply, especially 
and the reSUlting price rise 
for 
and 
quali ty decline. But even aside from these difficulties, 
the problems connected with log supply in the plywood 
industry are such as to suggest unfavorability of this 
industry for cooperative manufacturing enterprise. There 
are no regular sources of supply or known prices for the raw 
material. The continuous decline in quality has forced on 
the producers major changes in products and manufacturing 
techniques. This raw material, which is the largest share 
of plywood manufacturing costs, is variable, uncertain, and 
to a large extent unknown in quality and quantity yield. 
Technological changes may also be regarded as another 
characteristic of the plywood industry that is unfavorable 
to cooperative operation. Rapid technological change in the 
plywood industry began just after most of the plywood PCs 
were established. Rapid mechanization poses problems for 
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existing concerns. The problems are difficult, particularly 
in a gcowing industry where new plants are constantly being 
buil t to utilize the latest developments and particularly 
where, as in the plywood industry, the new technical 
developments are difficult to incorporate into existing 
plants. Mechanization requires large amounts of additional 
capital, and obtaining capital is difficult for pes. It 
seems evident that pes would fare best in an industry with 
stable technology. 
An assessment of the charactec:istics of the softwood 
plywood industry reveals that in the period when the plywood 
pes were established, the plywood industry may be judged to 
have been cornparati vely--al though not overwhelmingly--
favorable to PC ventuces. But the cluster of co-ops in the 
plywood industry is to be explained, not by unique features 
of the industry, but by a perhaps unique coincidence of 
certain other factors of an historical nature with a 
relatively favorable industry opportunity. Industry 
characteristics facilitated the establishment of the co-ops, 
but other factors supplied the impetus of their 
organization. 
The chief factor accounting for the formation in the 
1950s of the bulk of the plywood pes was undoubtedly the 
force of example--the example provided by the successful 
functioning of the plywood co-ops organized before World ~lar 
II. The successful pilot demonstration provided by the 
prewar plywood pes was at least aided by the accident of 
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timing: the entrance of these PCs into the industry just 
before the wartime boom and the postwar demand for plywood. 
Plant closures that supplied part of the impetus in the 
1950s for organization of worker-owned co-ops that took over 
conventional plants reflected in many cases another 
historical factor--the instability of the industry 
geographically, its migration in search of raw material 
supplies (from Washington to Oregon). 
The location of the early plywood industry in western 
Washington was another factor: producer cooperation was 
known there, particularly among lumber workers. The 
prevalence of men of Scandinavian origin among the Northwest 
wood workers was probably also a factor. These people were 
acquainted wi th the Scandani vian tradition of cooperation, 
as well as with the habit of saving, which yielded their 
capital to start co-ops, and ethnic homogeneity perhaps 
helped them to work together successfully. 
The establishment of the unusual cluster of co-ops in 
the plywood industry is, therefore, to be explained in terms 
of historical factors with favorable industry 
characteristics, not in terms of an industry uniquely 
predisposed to cooperative operations. But the most 
significant fact for assessing the relevance of the plywood 
experience to other industries is the survival and success 
of the plywood PCs in the period since 1955. This 
achievement cannot be explained in terms of a favorable 
industry, even if it is considered that the co-ops had the 
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advantage of a relatively favorable industry situation at 
the time they wer.e establ ished. It seems clear that the 
present softwood plywood industry does not on the whole 
present a situation especially favorable to cooperative 
activity, despite a number of favorable features. If the 
plywood PCs can prosper in the industry at present, as most 
are now doing, it would seem safe to conclude that 
possibilities of success of PC ventures exist in other 
industries as well. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
A number of areas pertinent to the subject of the 
plywood PCs have not been dealt with in the present study 
for lack of time and data. One suggestion for further study 
would be an attempt to assess industrial areas offering 
possibilities for successful operation of worker-owned 
co-ops. Perhaps to develop criteria for judging suitability 
for cooperative operation and suggestions for specific 
public or philanthropic private action that would aid PCs 
and extend the possible areas of their operation. The 
question of why and how the plywood PCs have been able to 
achieve greater productivity is obviously of great practical 
significance to management and has implications for many 
fields from economic growth to mental health. More 
comparative studies of co-op and conventional organizations 
are needed to explore the possible differences in 
organizational behavior and performance. 
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On a different level from these factual inquiries 
would be a study of the plywood pes from the viewpoint of 
economic theory. This would involve both application to the 
plywood co-ops of the analytical apparatus of production and 
organizational theories and exploration of possible 
implications of the experience of the plywood pes for 
theoretical economic concepts and relationships. 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Worker-owned co-ops provide an alternative form of 
economic organization. They can preserve features such as 
decentralized decision making and remuneration according to 
effort. At the same time they mitigate the dehumanizing 
tendencies of a wage system that sees labor merely as a 
producti ve service. pes enlarge the area of indi vidual 
responsibility and choice and give the person status and 
dignity in his role as a producer. 
~Jhi Ie producer co-ops may not provide the means of 
solving all of our economic problems, they show enough 
promise to be included in a public policy agenda for the 
United States. This final section considers how governments 
can best use and strengthen the efficiency and employment 
potentials of pes. 
Implications for Federal Government 
Political arguments regarding the role of government 
tends to run in extremes: either the federal government is 
so clumsy and inefficient that it cannot do much of anything 
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useful and the solution is to "get the government off our 
backs", or the federal government is called upon to sol ve 
every important social and economic problem. Neither of 
these extreme views provides useful guidance for addressing 
the nation's problems. The laissez-faire philosophy closes 
off opportunities for government intervention in problems 
that promise to do more things for more people. 
Out of this clash of extreme views, a new 
participatory ideology is emerging. This ideology 
recognizes the inherent limitations of national government 
in running programs in local areas, but also recognizes the 
great potential for federal leadership in stimulating and 
supporting locally based efforts (Whyte, et. al., 1983). 
There are important financial needs in facilitating social 
and economic readjustments that the federal government can 
finance without becoming committed to pump funds into every 
depressed region or company. Consider, for example, the 
experience of Economic Development Administration (EDA) and 
Small Business Administration (SBA) which since the 1960s 
have been two of the major government agencies dealing with 
probl ems of di stressed reg ions and companies. There have 
been a number of cases in which agencies such as EDA and SBA 
provided technical and financial assistance to employee 
buy-out attempts. In this regard, establishment of 
employee-owned co-ops is viewed as a viable policy option to 
many plant shutdowns to preserve local employment and avoid 
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community disruption. The need for such a policy was 
already felt during the 1970s, resulting in the beginnings 
of federal government response. The United States Senate 
passed a bill that would authorize the Small Business 
Administration to guarantee loans to employee-owned 
businesses and to organizations seeking to purchase their 
businesses. Also was the establishment of a Producer 
Cooperative Bank by Congress, and the passage of various 
employee stock ownership plan bills. However, the recent 
and continuing federal budget cuts have substantially 
reduced the amount of funds available to EDA and SBA. The 
Producer Cooperative Bank which is to provide loans to 
employee buy-out attempts is virtually eliminated under the 
current budget. The present federal government apparently 
embraces a doctrine of industrial Darwinism, which dictates that 
government should not bailout a company whose existence is 
threatened by financial losses or support a region in a 
depressed condition. The theory is that a 'o'leak company 
should be allowed to die and a depressed community should 
not be more than minimally supported so that its citizens 
will be motivated to move elsewhere. It puts all faith for 
economic growth and expansion in employment in the growth of 
existing, profi table firms. Unfortunately, this doctr ine 
ignores the positive outcomes of varieties of programs that 
agencies like EDA and SBA have supported. For example, in 
the 1970s EDA provided more loan money to more cases of 
employee buy-outs of closing plants than all other federal 
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agencies combined, making possible the saving of thousands 
of jobs. To this date, the agency has been cecovecing all 
loan money that went into direct suppoct of those pcojects. 
A majoc controversy acises fcom the use of public 
funds in convecting closing plants into employee-owned 
co-ops. On one side of the contcovecsy are those who 
believe wockecs have, oc should have, a cight to substantial 
job secucity and place a high value on policy measures that 
mitigate the effect of job loss. On the othec side are 
those who believe the use of public money in employee 
buy-outs of closing plants (1) results in the retention of 
inefficient operations since they have already ceased to be 
profi table: and (2) drains national funds which could be 
used in other areas of concern. The argument that employee 
buy-outs of closing plants lead to the retention of 
ineff icient operations lacks merit. Bluestone and Harrison 
(1980, 1982) have investigated cases of plant closures and 
found that not all closing operations are inefficient or 
unprofitable. It is also true that not all employee buy-out 
operations have been successful. But the number of failures 
has usually been small when compared with numerous cases of 
successful employee ownership operations. Furthermore, 
governmental support for employee buy-outs is found to be a 
cost-effective means of creating and retaining employment 
(Quilligan, 1986). Many of the closing plants do not need 
to be bailed out. What they need is assistance in setting 
up autonomous, decentralized, locally owned operations. A 
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public policy aimed at employee buy-outs of closing plants 
must take into consideration the future viability and 
efficiency of a closing concern. After assurances are made 
(through a feasibil ity study, for example) that a closing 
plant could become viable and productive, then conversion 
into employee-ownership will take place. 
There are several areas of governmental activity in 
which public policy could encourage the formation and growth 
of employee-owned cooperatives. The most obvious area is 
that of finance. In the past, for example, SBA provided 
assistance in this area to several plywood co-ops, enabling 
them to survive, expand or modernize. But much more could 
be done along these lines. In particular, provision of 
capital from public sources (in form of loans or guaranteed 
loans) in the initial organization of PCs would encourage 
their formation and lessen the danger of failure due to 
capital starvation because of the inadequate financial 
resources of workers seeking buyouts. Also, use of public 
funds or guarantees to aid the transfer of shares from 
present worker-owners wishing to sell to prospective members 
would be of benefit to cooperative producing ventures, 
facilitating their formation and their continuance as 
co-ops. 
Perhaps of equal benefit to PCs would be an 
informational and education program designed for the 
particular needs of co-op members. 
producing co-ops are not usually 
Workers who buy into 
acquainted with basic 
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accounting techniques and with the fundamental principles of 
management in varied fields of capital, production and 
sales. As active owners, they need some falliiliacity with 
these operat ing tools. An informational and educational 
program to make available to worker-owners the knowledge 
they need could be provided by the appropriate government 
agencies at small cost. Specialized individual assistance 
to employee-owned co-ops could be on a consultant basis. 
It is evident that the activities suggested for public 
agencies could also be provided by private groups. Those 
would be particularly appropriate activities for 
organizations devoted to promoting cooperative methods and 
also for those devoted to strengthening the participation 
and status of 
also take an 
the indi vidual in our soc iety . Unions can 
active part in local initiatives toward 
employee buy-outs. 
Implications for Local and State Governments 
There is an ongoing competi tion among states to 
attract companies into their communities to increase local 
employment. The often unproductive nature of these efforts 
suggests that the considerable resources devoted to such 
programs could be reduced with little sacrifice by the 
citizens of the states and local communities. Funds could 
be then shifted into the development of technical and 
financial assistance for working with companies, unions, and 
interested people in helping economic transition of their 
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regions, cushioning the effects of layoffs and plant 
shutdowns, and developing new jobs and new companies. Any 
state has some funds to be allocated to economic development 
projects. These funds can be more effectively spent if 
officials give special attention to local projects involving 
participation by concerned groups (such as management, union 
leaders and community workers). 
State and local support of worke" ownership seems a 
most appropriate vehicle in combating the continuing 
epidemic of plant closings and for economic development. In 
1982 Michigan passed the Economic Development Authority Act, 
providing the first state authority for financing employee 
ownership. The Act provides a special priority for employee 
buy-out efforts and requires that employees have full voting 
rights on all allocated and unallocated shares. The most 
far reaching proposal for state action to date is under 
consideration by the Pennsylvania state legislature. A 
proposed law would create a Steel Valley Authority, with 
powers of eminent domain to acquire closed and closing 
plants in order to facilitate worker buyouts (Sacks, 1986). 
Such laws would pave the way for the establishment of 
state-owned and employee-managed enterprises to preserve 
jobs or create new ones. A few other states have followed 
Michigan's lead in legislating programs to support employee 
ownership. While the laws vary in detail, all of them at 
least require a state agency to provide information about 
employee ownership and to provide some technical assistance 
to organizations seeking 
ownel:ship. 
to 
142 
establ ish this form of 
The revitalization of our depressed regions and 
communities must come through strengthening local 
initiatives and responsibilities. Employee-owned 
cooperatives can play significant roles in this process. 
These initiatives, however, cannot yield their potential 
benefits without financial support and technical assistance 
from the national and state authorities. Governments can 
stimulate and support locally based programs and help to 
empower people to make better use of the material and human 
resources in their communities. The characterization of the 
American economic system as "industrial democracy" could 
take on new meaning with a significant expansion of the 
worker-owned manufacturing cooperative form of enterprise. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Census of Manufacturers, 1983. 
2The Census Bureau figures for 1977 indicate that 
there were over $16,000 of net capital stock for every 
empeloyee in the softwood plywood industry compared with an 
average of nearly $19,000 for manufacturing in general. 
3 Bureau of the Census (1985), "Statistical Abstract of 
the U.S." 
4 Bureau of the Census, (1985), "Statistical Abstract 
of the U.S." 
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APPENDIX A 
SELECTED SAMPLES OF CO-OP AND 
CONVENTIONAL PLANTS 
PLANT 
---
#l 
#2 
#3 
#4 
#5 
#6 
#7 
#8 
PLANT 
#l 
jf2 
#3 
#4 
#5 
#6 
#7 
#8 
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CO-OP PLANTS 
NAME LOCATION 
Astoria Plywood Corp. Astoria, OR 
Linnton Plywood Assoc. Portland, OR 
Multnomah Plywood Corp. St. Helens, OR 
Hardel Mutual Plywood Corp. Olympia, WA 
Mt. Baker Plywood, Inc. Bellingham, WA 
North Pacific Plywood, Inc. Graham, WA 
Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. Tacoma, WA 
Stevenson Co-Ply, Inc. Stevenson, WA 
CONVENTIONAL PLANTS 
COMPANY PLANT LOCATION 
Boise Cascade Corp. 
Boise Cascade Corp. 
Independence, OR 
Valsetz, OR 
Champion International Corp. Gold Beach, OR 
Champion International Corp. Roseburg, OR 
Champion International Corp. Willamina, OR 
Simson Timber Co. Albany, OR 
Willamette Industries 
Willamette Industries 
Dallas, OR 
Foster, OR 
APPENDIX B 
DATA BASE 
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1~60 
Conventional Co-o12 
Plant ti. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 100 375 1959 72 233 1951 
2 60 360 1959 72 204 1953 
3 70 400 1959 90 300 1950 
4 76 435 1957 45 164 1947 
5 70 241 1957 50 185 1950 
6 61 269 1957 60 250 1921 
7 90 400 1957 120 325 1942 
8 100 365 1957 40 175 1949 
1~61 
1 100 374 1959 72 233 1951 
2 66 360 1959 72 204 1953 
3 95 400 1959 90 300 1?50 
4 95 447 1957 45 164 1947 
5 77 241 1957 60 185 1950 
6 61 269 1957 60 250 1921 
7 108 443 1957 120 325 1942 
8 100 365 1957 43 175 1949 
1962 
1 100 374 1959 60 265 1951 
2 72 360 1959 72 204 1953 
3 120 400 1959 96 325 1950 
4 129 459 1957 36 164 1947 
5 84 241 1957 60 185 1950 
6 61 246 1957 55 250 1921 
7 125 486 1957 120 325 1942 
8 100 365 1957 46 175 1949 
1963 
1 100 374 1959 60 265 1951 
2 70 360 1959 72 204 1c)53 
3 78 400 1959 96 325 1950 
4 96 480 1957 36 164 1<:)47 
5 72 241 1957 60 175 1950 
6 61 246 1957 55 250 1S121 
7 110 486 1957 120 325 1942 
8 110 365 1957 48 175 1949 
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1264 
Conventional Co-oE 
Plant "Ii. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 100 374 1959 75 265 1951 
2 72 360 1959 72 200 1953 
3 120 400 1959 96 325 1950 
4 129 502 1957 39 164 1947 
5 84 241 1957 60 175 1950 6 61 246 1957 55 250 1921 
7 125 486 1957 120 325 1942 
8 125 365 1957 60 175 1949 
1265 
1 132 313 1959 80 250 1951 
2 72 295 1959 75 200 1953 
3 120 387 1959 100 321 1950 4 115 492 1957 54 175 1947 
5 86 236 1957 60 175 1950 
6 64 246 1957 60 250 1921 
7 145 517 1957 120 325 1942 
8 125 353 1957 65 175 1949 
1966 
1 108 253 1959 80 235 1951 
2 72 295 1959 75 200 1953 
3 90 375 1959 100 317 1950 4 115 482 1957 66 175 1947 
5 72 230 1957 70 175 1950 
6 64 246 1957 75 250 1921 
7 150 548 1957 120 325 1942 
8 125 340 1957 60 175 1949 
1962 
1 116 257 1959 80 235 1951 
2 72 210 1959 75 200 1953 
3 90 377 1959 100 324 1950 
4 125 462 1957 70 175 1947 
5 72 233 1957 70 175 1950 
6 64 239 1957 75 250 1921 
7 150 488 1957 144 325 1942 
8 135 345 1957 66 175 1949 
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1968 
Conventional Co-oE 
Plant ti. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 116 260 1959 80 235 1951 
2 72 220 1959 75 200 1953 
3 90 380 1959 100 330 1950 
4 125 443 1957 70 175 1947 
5 72 235 1957 72 175 1950 
6 64 231 1957 75 250 1921 
7 150 428 1957 144 325 1942 
8 120 350 1957 68 175 1949 
1969 
1 120 260 1959 82 235 1951 
2 80 200 1959 93 200 1953 
3 115 340 1959 120 315 1950 
4 130 443 1957 60 175 1947 
5 85 235 1957 86 175 1950 
6 65 231 1957 75 250 1921 
7 140 427 1957 97 325 1942 
8 102 350 1957 72 175 1949 
1920 
1 110 260 - "1959 70 235 1951 
2 70 180 1959 85 200 1953 
3 117 300 1959 75 300 1950 
4 125 443 1957 38 175 1947 
5 86 235 1957 64 175 1950 6 65 231 1957 67 250 1921 
7 129 425 1957 90 325 1942 
8 114 350 1957 60 175 1949 
1221 
1 118 260 1959 81 235 1951 
2 72 180 1959 84 200 1953 
3 118 300 1959 96 300 1950 
4 130 443 1957 51 175 1947 
5 96 235 1957 87 175 1950 
6 70 231 1957 72 250 1921 
7 120 425 1957 90 325 1942 
8 135 288 1957 60 175 1949 
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1922 
Conventional Co-oE 
Plant ti. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 136 260 1959 90 235 1951 
2 79 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 125 300 1959 100 300 1950 
4 145 443 1957 66 175 1947 
5 112 235 1957 84 175 1950 
6 68 231 1957 80 250 1921 
7 140 425 1957 110 325 1942 
8 120 225 1957 60 175 1949 
122~ 
1 154 255 1959 99 235 1951 
2 86 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 116 300 1959 100 300 1950 
4 156 509 1957 70 175 1947 
5 110 272 1957 100 175 1950 
6 73 256 1957 84 250 1921 
7 144 443 1957 108 325 1942 
8 140 225 1957 76 175 1949 
1924 
1 154 250 1959 100 235 1951 
2 86 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 130 300 1959 120 300 1950 
4 155 575 1957 80 175 1947 
5 110 310 1957 90 175 1950 
6 68 275 1957 80 250 1921 
7 143 460 1957 102 325 1942 
8 140 225 1957 76 175 1949 
1925 
1 120 250 1959 90 235 1951 
2 86 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 140 300 1959 120 300 1950 
4 160 575 1957 80 175 1947 
5 114 310 1957 82 175 1950 
6 62 275 1957 92 250 1921 
7 152 460 1957 130 325 1942 
8 140 225 1957 80 175 1949 
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1226 
Conventional Co-o12 
Plant ti. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 120 250 1959 96 235 1951 
2 84 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 140 300 1959 120 300 1950 
4 161 575 1957 80 175 1947 
5 122 . 310 1957 95 200 1950 
6 62 275 1957 84 250 1921 
7 152 460 1957 130 325 1942 
8 140 225 1957 84 175 1949 
1222 
1 120 250 1959 95 235 1951 
2 85 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 135 300 1959 140 287 1950 
4 164 575 1957 90 '175 1947 
5 117 305 1957 90 200 1950 
6 75 238 1957 84 250 1921 
7 144 460 1957 109 325 1942 
8 151 225 1957 80 175 1949 
1928 
1 123 250 1959 112 235 1951 
2 81 180 1959 100 200 1953 
3 154 300 1959 150 325 1950 
4 166 575 1957 100 175 1947 
5 151 300 1957 115 200 1950 
6 62 200 1957 98 250 1921 
7 154 460 1957 148 325 1942 
8 151 225 1957 84 175 1949 
1279 
1 123 250 1959 112 235 1951 
2 81 180 1959 110 200 1953 
3 154 300 1959 160 325 1950 
4 166 482 1957 120 175 1947 
5 170 300 1957 90 200 1950 
6 72 200 1957 147 250 1921 
7 156 368 1957 120 325 1942 
8 150 350 1957 102 175 1949 
.. ------ -------------------------------
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1980 
Conventional CO-O!! 
Plant Ii. Q E YB ~ E YB 
1 123 250 1959 110 235 1951 
2 81 180 1959 110 200 1953 
3 150 300 1959 150 375 1950 
4 165 390 1957 120 175 1947 
5 170 300 1957 118 225 1950 
6 72 200 1957 104 250 1921 
7 155 275 1957 120 325 1942 
8 150 475 1957 108 175 1949 
1981 
1 123 250 1959 110 235 1951 
2 81 180 1959 110 200 1953 
3 150 300 1959 150 340 1950 
4 170 390 1957 120 175 1947 
5 170 300 1957 100 215 1950 
6 72 200 1957 104 250 1921 
7 150 275 1957 120 325 1942 
8 142 475 1957 108 175 1949 
1982 
1 123 250 1959 110 235 1951 
2 81 180 1959 110 200 1953 
3 150 300 1959 150 305 1950 
4 170 390 1957 120 175 1947 
5 78 300 1957 95 215 1950 
6 72 200 1957 104 250 1921 
7 150 275 1957 120 325 1942 
8 142 475 1957 108 175 1949 
